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 1 
Summary 
The European Border and Coast Guard was launched on October 6
th
, 2016. 
It was established through Regulation 2016/1624 and replaces the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States. The Agency is more known as Frontex. 
 
The objective with this thesis is to examine two problems in Regulation 
2016/1624 that was addressed at the negotiations to the Regulation. The first 
problem was that the Member States considered the delegated competences 
to the Agency being too wide and violated the allocation of competences in 
the Union Treaties. The second problem was that Regulation 2016/1624 did 
not define if the Agency has a responsibility to protect the fundamental 
rights of asylum seekers. This is examined through two research questions. 
 
The first research question is whether the delegated competences to the 
European Border and Coast Guard in Regulation 2016/1624 is violating the 
Union Treaties. The second research question is whether the Agency has a 
responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers.  
 
In order to answer these questions, a description is given in Chapter 2 on the 
allocation of competences and on the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. 
All fundamental rights of asylum-seekers derive from the non-refoulement 
principle. An analysis is given on the relationship between the allocation of 
competences and the responsibility of the Union to protect fundamental 
rights. In Chapter 3, an analysis is carried out on to the allocation of 
competences and the competences of the Agency. In Chapter 4, the 
responsibility of the Agency to protect fundamental human rights of 
asylum-seekers is analysed.  
 
The conclusions are that the European Border and Coast Guard has 
competences that, in some aspects, violates the Union Treaties and that the 
Agency has a responsibility to protect the non-refoulement principle. The 
principle is jus cogens, compelling international law, from which no 
derogation is allowed.  
 
Through these conclusions, another problem is detected. The Union cannot 
interfere in the executive powers of the Member States to issue decisions of 
entry, asylum or return, as this would violate the allocation of competences. 
However, the responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of asylum-
seekers requires the Agency to intervene in these executive powers.  
 
The dilemma is analysed in Chapter 5 and the conclusion is reached, that 
there is reason to argue that the responsibility to protect fundamental rights 
of asylum-seekers expands the competences of the Union. However, this is 
very likely to never be accepted by the Member States. This since it can be 
seen as a threat to the sovereignty of the Member States. 
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Sammanfattning 
Den europeiska kust- och gränsbevakningsbyrån lanserades den 6 oktober 
2016. Byrån etablerades genom förordning 2016/1624 och ersätter den 
europeiska byrån för förvaltningen av det operativa samarbetet vid 
Europeiska unionens medlemsstaters yttre gränser. Byrån är mer känd som 
Frontex. 
 
Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka två problem i förordning 
2016/1624 som lyftes under förhandlingarna till förordningen. Det första 
problemet var att medlemsstaterna ansåg att de delegerade befogenheterna 
till byrån var för breda och stred med fördelningen av befogenheter i 
unionsfördragen. Det andra problemet var att förordning 2016/1624 inte 
definierade om myndigheten har ett ansvar att skydda mänskliga rättigheter 
för asylsökande. Problemen undersöks genom två forskningsfrågor. 
 
Den första forskningsfrågan är om de delegerade befogenheterna till 
myndigheten i förordning 2016/1624 står i strid med unionsfördragen. Den 
andra forskningsfrågan är om byrån har ett ansvar att skydda mänskliga 
rättigheter för asylsökande. 
 
För att besvara dessa frågor ges en beskrivning i kapitel 2 på fördelningen 
av befogenheter och de mänskliga rättigheterna för asylsökande. Alla 
mänskliga rättigheter för asylsökande härstammar från non-refoulement 
principen. Här ges också en analys över förhållandet mellan fördelningen av 
befogenheter och unionens ansvar att skydda mänskliga rättigheter. I kapitel 
3 genomförs en analys av fördelningen av befogenheter och byråns 
befogenheter. I kapitel 4 analyseras myndighetens ansvar att skydda 
mänskliga rättigheter för asylsökande.  
 
Slutsatserna är att den europeiska kust- och gränsbevakningsbyrån har 
befogenheter som, i vissa aspekter, strider mot unionsfördragen och att 
byrån har ett ansvar att skydda non-refoulement principen. Principen är jus 
cogens, tvingande internationell rätt, och inga undantag kan göras från 
denna princip.  
 
Genom dessa slutsatser, upptäcks ett annat problem. Unionen kan inte lägga 
sig i de verkställande makterna hos medlemsstaterna, t.ex. att utfärda beslut 
om tillträde, asyl eller att skicka tillbaka en person som sökt asyl. Detta 
skulle strida mot fördelningen av befogenheter. Men, ansvaret för byrån att 
skydda de mänskliga rättigheterna för asylsökande innebär att byrån måste 
lägga sig i dessa verkställande makter.  
 
Dilemmat analyseras i kapitel 5. Slutsatsen är att det kan argumenteras att 
ansvaret att skydda mänskliga rättigheter expanderar unionens befogenheter. 
Dock, kommer detta troligen inte att accepteras av medlemsstaterna. Detta 
kan nämligen ses som ett hot mot medlemsstaternas suveränitet.   
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Abbreviations 
1967 Protocol Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
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CAT United Nations Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
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CFSP Common foreign and security policy 
Charter Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
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EXCOM Executive Committee of the Programme of the 
High Commissioner 
Geneva Convention United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights  
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 
UN  United Nations 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees  
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1 Introduction  
The political climate within the Union has undergone a radical change 
within the last years. It has shifted from protecting and helping asylum-
seekers to increased focus on security and protection against terrorism. The 
European Border and Coast Guard with its expanded competences in 
external borders management is one of many measures taken in relation to 
this. The changes have been made rapidly and questions have been raised if 
the adopted measures are in compliance with Union Law and whether the 
non-refoulement principle is protected.   
 
1.1 Background 
The European Border and Coast Guard was launched on October 6
th
, 2016 
and established through Regulation 2016/1624. The Agency replaces the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States. Both the new and old version of the 
Agency goes under the name Frontex. Regulation 2016/1624 expands the 
competences of the European Border and Coast Guard in the management 
of external borders. This includes the management of the high inflow of 
asylum-seekers seeking refuge within the Union.   
 
A person fleeing its country is entitled to asylum if the person qualifies as a 
refugee. The requirements for being considered a refugee are laid down in 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Geneva Convention). 
The Geneva Convention also contains the non-refoulement principle, which 
requires that a refugee cannot be expelled or returned to a territory where 
the refugee’s life or freedom can be threatened. This is the most important 
fundamental right in regards to asylum-seekers. All fundamental rights for 
asylum seekers derive from the non-refoulement principle. 
 
In 2015, Europe saw a massive inflow of asylum-seekers. Pressure was put 
on the Member States, and Union law was not fit to handle the situation. At 
first, the Union was trying to help the asylum-seekers and focus was put on 
how to handle the inflow of them. The Paris attacks in 2015 were committed 
by persons crossing the external border with forged Syrian papers. This 
changed the focus within the Union from protecting asylum-seekers to 
protecting the Union from terrorism. More controls at the external borders 
were put up. As part of this, the European Border and Coast Guard with its 
new enhanced competences was established.  
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1.2 Objective 
At the negotiations of Regulation 2016/1624 and in the following 
discussions on the European Border and Coast Guard, two problems were 
emphasized. 
  
The first problem was that the Member States considered the delegated 
competences to the Agency as being too wide. The competences were 
regarded as threatening the sovereignty of the Member States. Through case 
law and in practice it has been established that the Union can delegate 
competences to bodies of the Union, such as the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency. However, the Union institutions can only delegate 
competences that have been conferred from the Member States upon the 
Union institutions themselves. That the Union only possesses competences 
that has been conferred upon them is known as the allocation of 
competences and this is regulated in the Union Treaties. The delegated 
competences in Regulation 2016/1624 were argued to be in violation of the 
allocation of competences, and thereby violating the Union Treaties. The 
Union Treaties are primary law and regulations are secondary law. 
Secondary law is to be considered void if it violates primary law.  
 
The second problem was that Regulation 2016/1624 was regarded as not 
protecting the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. These concerns were 
raised by organisations such as United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and legal professors, e.g. Steve Peers. In the 
Regulation, the focus is put on safety, security and control. There are no 
provisions defining what responsibility the Agency has, to protect the non-
refoulement principle. The fundamental rights of asylum seekers derive 
from the non-refoulement principle. Several organisations, such as Amnesty 
International and UNHCR, were alarmed that the fundamental rights of the 
asylum-seekers would not be protected in the work of the Agency.       
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine these two problems: the wide 
competence of the Agency and the responsibility of the Agency to protect 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. In order to do this, this objective is 
divided into two parts. The first part of the objective is to examine the 
allocation of competences in the Union Treaties and the competences of the 
European Border and Coast Guard. The second part of the objective is to 
examine the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers and the responsibility of 
the European Border and Coast Guard to protect these fundamental rights.   
 
1.3 Research Questions 
To be able to fulfil the objective of this thesis, the two parts of the objective 
has been further narrowed down to two research questions.   
 
The first research question is to assess if the competences delegated to the 
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European Border and Coast Guard in Regulation 2016/1624 is violating the 
Union Treaties. Within this question, attention is paid to the allocation of 
competences in the Union Treaties.  
 
The second research question is to examine whether the Agency has a 
responsibility to protect the all fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. As 
explained in Title 1.1 Background, all fundamental rights of asylum-seekers 
derive from the non-refoulement principle. This implies that the two 
expressions “the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers” and “the non-
refoulement principle” has, in principle, the same meaning. Throughout this 
thesis, both these expressions will be used and they should be read as 
entailing the same definition.   
 
These two research questions deal with two different problems in 
Regulation 2016/1624; the allocation of competences and the responsibility 
of the European Border and Coast Guard to protect fundamental rights of 
asylum-seekers. This can be regarded as two very different matters. 
However, the analyses of the problem will show that they are intertwined 
and have effect on each other. It is difficult to do a proper analysis on one of 
the problems without an analysis on the second. Therefore, both problems 
will be examined within the scope of this thesis.     
 
1.4 Methods and Material 
For this thesis, a traditional legal dogmatic method is applied.  
 
In regards to material, a wide variety has been used. For the more 
descriptive part on allocation of competences, the article “Some remarks on 
the Allocation of Competences between the European Union and its 
Member States” by Udo Di Fabio, published in Common Market Law 
Review was very useful. The article offered a deeper insight and 
understanding of the allocation of competences. Therefore it was, a good 
complement to the text book European Union Law, with Steve Peers and 
Catherine Barnard as editors, that only gave a very general overview of the 
basics of the allocation of competences. The Opinion of Advocate General 
Sharpston delivered on 21 December 2016 in Opinion Procedure 2/15 was 
also very helpful in getting a deeper understanding of the allocation of 
competences in general but especially the relation between shared and 
exclusive competences. The Opinions of the Advocate Generals lack legal 
binding force. However, they give a good overview and insight on the topic 
and the legal argumentation. They are often followed by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU). Opinions are therefore good and trustful 
sources.  
 
The article “The Principle of Non-refoulement and the Right of Asylum 
Seekers to Enter State Territory”, written by Vladislava Stoyanova and 
published in Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law was very 
useful when defining which fundamental rights asylum-seekers are 
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protected by. Roberta Mungianu’s book Frontex and non-refoulement: the 
international responsibility of the EU also offered good guidance in regards 
to fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. Mungianu’s book was also 
comprehensive on Frontex. However, the book is based on the earlier 
Frontex Regulation from 2011 (Regulation 1168/2011) and was published in 
the year 2016, before the adoption of Regulation 2016/1624. It therefore 
gives no guidance on Regulation 2016/1624, but since the Agency has 
stayed the same legal body the book was useful. However, only as long the 
changes in Regulation 2016/1624 were regarded.  
 
The relation between allocation of competences and the responsibility of the 
Union to protect fundamental rights is very well examined and explained by 
Elise Muir in the article “Fundamental Rights: An Unsettling EU 
Competence” in Human Rights Review. Edouard Dubout’s Chapter, “The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights and the Allocation of Competences in the 
EU: A Clash of Constitutional Logics”, in the book The Question of 
Competence in the European Union, was also very helpful.  
 
Comprehensive argumentation about Regulation 2016/1624 and the 
European Border and Coast Guard was not available in many printed 
sources. This is because the Regulation was adopted as late as October 
2016, only nine months before the writing of this thesis. Good and 
comprehensive analyses on the Regulation could however be found in legal 
blogs such as EU Law Analysis – Expert insight into EU law developments. 
Especially the two articles “The Reform of Frontex: Saving Schengen at 
Refugees’ Expense”, written by Steve Peers and “Establishing the European 
Border and Coast Guard: all-new or Frontex reloaded?”, written by Herbert 
Rosenfeldt gave a good insight into as well as an analysis of the problems in 
Regulation 2016/1624. The professor of EU and Human Rights Law Steve 
Peers is the editor of the blog EU Law Analysis – Expert insight into EU law 
developments and all articles are written by legal professors or lawyers. The 
articles in this blog is thereby highly reliable. In the thesis, focus has also 
been put on the provisions in the Regulation 2016/1624 itself, as the 
objective is to examine this Regulation.  
 
On international law and the status of the non-refoulement principle, the 
articles “The jus cogens Nature of non-refoulement”, by Jean Allain in 
International Journal of Refugee Law and “The Meso Level: Means of 
Interaction between EU and International Law. Customary International 
Law as Source of EU Law: A Two-Way Fertilization Route?”, by Theodore 
Konstadinides in Yearbook of European Law, has been very useful. The 
articles explained the concept of jus cogens and carried out analyses on non-
refoulement as jus cogens.  
 
1.5 Delimitation 
Whether Regulation 2016/1624 and the European Border and Coast Guard 
is violating the Union Treaties is a very wide subject. A complete 
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assessment would not be possible within the range of this graduate thesis 
and a delimitation to only the aspect of the allocation of competences have 
therefore been set. Focus is put on this aspect, since the wide competences 
of the Agency have been regarded as one of the biggest problems in 
Regulation 2016/1624.    
 
An important note to make in regards to the allocation of competences is 
that only the Member States can confer competences to the Union. In the 
Union Treaties, it is not explicitly stated that bodies, such as agencies, can 
possess competences. Agencies of the Union is a phenomenon that has been 
developed through practice, not law. Through case law and the Meroni 
doctrine it is explained that the competences are delegated from the Union 
institutions to the agencies. This field of law and the Meroni doctrine is a 
very complex matter with few legal sources. Due to the limited time and 
resources that can be put into this thesis, a further analysis on the delegation 
of competences to agencies will not be given. Instead, only a shorter 
description will be presented.  
 
The relation between the European Border and Coast Guard and the non-
refoulement principles is yet another wide subject. This thesis will only 
further investigate if the Agency has a responsibility to protect the non-
refoulement principle. A complete analysis on whether the Agency is 
violating the non-refoulement principle or how the Agency should act to 
ensure that the principle is followed is outside the scope of this thesis.   
 
The European Border and Coast Guard is very closely related to the area of 
migration law within Union law. The area of migration law is known as the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS). CEAS covers the regulations 
and directives that regulates everything from deciding on which Member 
State shall carry out the asylum procedure to stating minimum requirement 
for the living situations of asylum-seekers. This is an interesting area of law, 
but not one that is required to answer the research questions of this thesis. 
Because of this, no further description of CEAS will be given.  
 
The thesis deals with Union law and problem at a Union level. Therefore, no 
closer examination of national law of any of the Member States is given.  
 
1.6 Disposition 
The disposition of this graduate thesis will start out with a more descriptive 
part in Chapter 2. This part will give an introduction to the interests behind 
the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard (Title 2). Then 
explain the allocation of competences between the Union and Member 
States (Title 2.1) together with a definition of agencies and the delegation of 
competences to agencies (Title 2.1.4). This is then followed by an 
explanation on which fundamental rights the asylum-seekers have (Title 
2.2). Lastly, the relationship between the allocation of competences and the 
protection of fundamental rights is examined (Title 2.3).  
 10 
 
After this, the thesis will focus on the European Border and Coast Guard 
and the allocation of competences in Chapter 3. First a short background on 
the Agency will be given (Title 3.1). Then the tasks of the Agency are 
presented, this to show what the Agency is entitled to do, or in other words, 
which competences it possesses (Title 3.2). In Title 3.3, the aspects of the 
tasks of the Agency that might cause problems in regards of Union 
competence is presented and analysed. A conclusion on the first research 
question is presented (Title 3.4).  
 
In Chapter 4 the focus is put on fundamental rights. Here, an analysis is 
made on Union law and international law. It is assessed whether any of the 
legal sources within these areas of law can be used to argue that the 
European Border and Coast Guard has a responsibility to protect the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. In Title 4.2.4 is also the protection of 
the Union against terrorism regarded. In Title 4.5, the Conclusion is reached 
that the Agency has a responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of 
asylum-seekers. This is because the non-refoulement principle is jus cogens, 
compelling international law.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions on the two research questions. It is here 
assessed that another problem can be detected. The allocation of 
competences does not allow the Agency to properly carry out its 
responsibility to protect fundamental rights. This dilemma is analysed in 
Title 5.2. In Title 5.3, the final conclusion is reached. The final conclusion is 
that the responsibility to protect fundamental rights of asylum-seekers can 
expand the competences of the Agency. However, this will not be accepted 
by the Member States, since it can be regarded as a threat to the sovereignty 
of the Member States.  
 
Before the Bibliography, a spreadsheet can be found in Supplement A. This 
spreadsheet gives the reader an overview of the different categories of 
competences allocated between the Union and the Member States. The 
spreadsheet shows where provisions dealing with the different policy areas 
in the categories of competence can be found.     
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2 The European Union 
We Europeans should know and should never forget why giving 
refuge and complying with the fundamental right to asylum is so 
important. …So it is high time to act to manage the refugee 
crisis. – Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of 
the Union 2015.
1
 
 
We must defend ourselves against terrorism. …tolerance cannot 
come at the price of our security… We need to know who is 
crossing our borders. That is why we will defend our borders 
with the new European Border and Coast Guard… – 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union 
2016.
2
 
 
The State of the Union is an annual speech held by the President of the 
European Commission to the European Parliament since 2010. It was 
instituted with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and its objective is to make 
the political life of the Union more democratic and transparent. In the 
speech, the Commission President addresses the events passed in the latest 
year and announces the political priorities for the coming years.
3
  
 
The State of the Union gives a good overview of the political climate in the 
Union. A very striking change happened within the Union from 2015 to 
2016, which is illustrated by the two quotes above. In 2015, focus was put 
on helping asylum-seekers and standing up for their fundamental rights.
4
 
After recent terror attacks, the focus has shifted to preserving security within 
the Union. In the 2016 speech, terrorism is mentioned several times and 
focus is put on defending and protecting the borders. No mention is made of 
refugees and their fundamental rights.
5
 
 
The development of the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union (Frontex) into the European Border and Coast Guard is 
one of the measures taken in order to strengthen border control.
6
 The change 
                                                 
1
 Juncker, Jean-Claude. (2015, September 9) “State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, 
Unity and Solidarity”, European Commission [Transcript]. Retrieved from: 
<www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm>, accessed 2017-02-14. 
2
 Juncker, Jean-Claude. (2016, September 14). “State of the Union 2016: Towards a better 
Europe – a Europe that protects, empowers and defends”, European Commission 
[Transcript]. Retrieved from: <www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-
3043_en.htm>, accessed 2017-02-14. 
3
 Institutional agreement, Framework Agreement on relations between the European 
Parliament and the European Commission, L 304/47, 20 November 2010, Annex IV, p. 5.    
4
 Juncker (2015). 
5
 Juncker (2016). 
6
 Rosenfeldt, Herbert. (2016 October 16). “Establishing the European Border and Coast 
Guard: all-new or Frontex reloaded?”, in blog: EU Law Analysis – Expert insight into EU 
law developments, by Peers, Steve, (ed.), retrieved from 
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came quickly with the first mention of amending the Frontex Regulation at 
the informal meeting on migration of the Heads of State or Governments on 
September 23
rd
, 2015.
7
 Only a year later, on October 6
th
, 2016, the European 
Border and Coast Guard Regulation 2016/1624 came into force and the 
Agency was launched. These quick changes and developments within the 
Union awoke concerns about the compliance with Union law and important 
international law, such as the non-refoulement principle.
8
  
 
The new Frontex, in the form of the European Border and Coast Guard has 
been given greater competences than ever before. With the new mandate the 
Agency can act within the areas of freedom, security and justice, and 
interfere in the Member States’ external border control. This raises concerns 
that the Union, through the European Border and Coast Guard, is acting 
outside of its own competences and endangering the sovereignty of the 
Member States, thereby not complying with the allocation of competence 
between the Union and the Member States.
9
 
 
Since the focus has now shifted from helping and managing the asylum 
seekers crossing the borders to security, concerns have been raised in 
regards to the fundamental rights of the asylum seekers. As an asylum 
seeker fleeing from one’s State of origin, one is entitled to international 
protection if one fulfils the criteria for a refugee. This is governed by Union 
law as well as in international treaties such as the Convention Relating to 
the Status of refugees
10
 (Geneva Convention) and the Convention for the 
protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
11
 (ECHR). 
Criticism has been directed at the Agency that they do not do enough in the 
field of fundamental rights of asylum seekers, thereby violating these 
fundamental rights and endangering the safety and lives of asylum seekers.
12
  
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine these two problems. In order to 
attain this objective, two research questions have been set. The first research 
question is whether the competences delegated to the European Border and 
Coast Guard in Regulation 2016/1624 is in violation to the allocation of 
competences in Union Treaties.  
                                                                                                                            
<www.eulawanalysis.blogspot.de/2016/10/establishing-european-border-and-coast.html> 
accessed 2017-02-22. 
7
 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, OJ L 251/1, 16 September 2016, Preamble 
no. 1.  
8
 Rosenfeldt (2016). 
9
 Rosenfeldt (2016).  
10
 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 
1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137, available at: 
<www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html> accessed 2017-02-12. 
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 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 
5, available at: <www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html>, accessed 2017-02-02. 
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 Rosenfeldt (2016).  
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The second problem, regarding the protection of fundamental rights for 
asylum seekers, is however another matter. In order to examine this problem 
a second research question has been set. Concerns have been raised that the 
Agency is violating fundamental rights. However, the Agency cannot be 
regarded as violating fundamental right if they have no responsibility to 
protect them, in the first place. Therefore, the third research question in this 
thesis is to examine what responsibility the Agency must protect the 
fundamental rights of asylum seekers. 
 
To be able to answer these research questions and in order to give the reader 
a better insight to the research questions and the problems being examined 
in this thesis, Chapter 2 is more of a descriptive character. In Title 2.1, the 
allocation of competences will be explained. Here, the establishment of 
agencies and the delegation of competences to agencies is also described. 
This, in order to give the reader an insight in the matters that regards the 
first research question.  
 
In the next part of Chapter 2, the focus will be shifted to the fundamental 
rights of asylum-seekers. In order to examine which responsibility the 
Agency has to protect fundamental rights of asylum-seekers, it must be 
examined from where the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers derive and 
what they entail. This is described in Title 2.3. Also, the relationship 
between the allocation of competences and the responsibility to protect 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers is analysed. This analysis is needed in 
order to examine whether the extended competences of the Agency have an 
influence on their responsibilities to protect fundamental rights.   
 
2.1 Allocation of Competences 
In order to understand the allocation of competences between the Union and 
the Member States it is important to understand the principles of conferral, 
subsidiarity and proportionality. These three principles are central within 
Union law and make up the very foundation of the Union and the 
relationship to its Member States.
13
 
 
The Union itself does not have Kompetenz-Kompetenz, meaning that the 
Union does not have competence to decide in which matters they have 
competence. This is instead decided and limited by the Member States as 
they confer competences to the Union through the Treaties.
14
 The principle 
of conferral entails that the Union cannot act beyond the competences the 
                                                 
13
 Bradley, Kieran St C. (2014). “Legislating in the European Union”, in: European Union 
Law, Barnard, Catherine and Peers, Steve (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 
pp. 104-105. 
14
 Di Fabio, Udo, “Some Remarks on the Allocation of Competences between the European 
Union and its Member States”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 39, 2002, pp. 1292-
1294. See also C-376/98, Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union, EU:C:2000:544, para. 83 and 107.  
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Member States have agreed to confer, give, to the Union. The principle is 
stated in Article 1, 5.1 and 5.2 in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) but 
can also be found in several other provisions throughout the Treaties.  
 
The principle of subsidiarity governs whether the Union should act within a 
competence. It is not applicable to the exclusive competence of the Union, 
since within this competence, the Union is always allowed to act. The 
subsidiarity principle states that power should be exercised as close as 
possible to the citizen. This means that the Union can only act when the 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but instead 
better achieved at Union level, thereby setting a limit to the competences of 
the Union.
15
 This principle is found in Article 1 and 5.3 TEU. Today, the 
national parliaments of the Member States can use the so called “yellow 
card procedure” to stop the adoption of a legislative act that they consider to 
be a violation of the subsidiarity principle.
16
  
 
The third principle, the principle of proportionality, is defined in Article 5.4 
TEU and entails that the Union shall always act in the least possible 
intrusive way to achieve their goals. The Union cannot act in a way that 
goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives in the Treaties.
17
 
  
The competences are divided into different categories. The main three 
categories are exclusive competence, shared competence and the 
competence to support, coordinate and supplement.
18
 The allocation of 
competences was earlier regulated in the case law of Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). Through the Lisbon Treaty, the case law was 
codified into TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).
19
 All the categories of competences are stated in Article 2 TFEU. 
The different policy areas fall within the different categories of competence. 
Which area belongs to which category can be read in Articles 3 to 6 TFEU. 
Several of the policy areas are further regulated in more detailed provisions 
throughout TEU and TFEU. In Supplement A is a spreadsheet found, lists 
which policy area belongs to which category and the detailed provisions for 
the policy area (see Supplement A).  
 
When deciding on a category of competence a legislative act shall be placed 
in, the legal base of the act must be assessed first.
20
 In regards to Regulation 
2016/1624 establishing the European Border and Coast Guard, Articles 
77.2.b, 77.2.d and 19.2.c are set as legal base. These Articles are all under 
Title V Area of freedom, security and justice. The policy area of freedom, 
security and justice is found in Article 4.2.j TFEU and Regulation 
                                                 
15
 Di Fabio, Udo (2002). See also C-376/98, Germany v European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union, EU:C:2000:544, para. 83 and 107.  
16
 Craig, Paul and De Búrca, Gráinne. (2015). EU law: text, cases and materials, 6th ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 96-102. 
17
 Bradley (2014) p. 116. 
18
 Craig and De Búrca (2015) p. 73. 
19
 Bradley (2014) p. 107.  
20
 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 21 December 2016 in Opinion 
procedure 2/15, EU:C:2016:992, para. 87-94.  
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2016/1624 falls under the category of shared competence. Below, a more 
thorough description will be given to each of the different categories. 
 
When assessing the legal base, it is important to remember that it is not 
given that the Treaty Articles mentioned in the beginning of a Regulation, 
Directive or any other Union act is the correct legal base. The legal base can 
only be assessed on objective factors that include the aim and content of the 
measure, which can be amended through judicial review.
21
  
 
2.1.1 Exclusive Competence 
Within the areas where the Union has exclusive competence, only the Union 
can act, legislate and adopt legally binding acts. The Member States are only 
allowed to act when empowered by the Union or when they are 
implementing Union acts.
22
  
 
The Union has exclusive competence within the areas of the custom union, 
the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market, monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is 
the euro, the conservation of the marine biological resources under the 
common fisheries policy and the common commercial policy. This is stated 
in Article 3.1 TFEU and this list is meant to be exhaustive.
23
 Article 3.2 
TFEU further states the Union’s external exclusive competence, meaning 
when the Union has exclusive competence for the conclusion of an 
international agreement.
24
 
  
2.1.2 Shared Competence 
The shared competences are defined in Article 4 TFEU. This category is 
residual, meaning that when no other competence is explicitly stated the 
area shall be assessed to fall within the shared competence. The areas within 
the shared competences are the internal market; social policy, for the aspects 
as defined in the Treaty; economic, social and territorial cohesion; 
agriculture and fishery, excluding the conservation of marine biological 
resources; environment; consumer protection; transport; trans-European 
networks; energy; area of freedom, security and justice and common safety 
concerns in public health matters, for the aspect as defined in this Treaty.
25
 
Exactly how the competences are allocated is stated in more detailed 
provisions that are related to each area. The exact allocation of competences 
can therefore vary within this category depending on policy area.
26
 See 
                                                 
21
 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 21 December 2016 in Opinion 
procedure 2/15, EU:C:2016:992, para. 87-94.  
22
 Craig and De Búrca (2015) p. 78. 
23
 Bradley (2014) pp. 107-108. 
24
 Craig and De Búrca (2015) pp. 81-83. 
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 Craig and De Búrca (2015) pp. 83-84.  
26
 Craig and De Búrca (2015) p. 85.  
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Supplement A for a spread sheet on where the more detailed provisions can 
be found. 
 
In areas where the competence is shared, the Member State can only act 
within matters where the Union has not yet legislated or acted on.
27
 The 
matters within the area, where the Union has acted are referred to as pre-
empted.
28
 When the Union has legislated in a way that covers a whole area, 
the area is in practice within the exclusive competence of the Union. It is 
important to clarify that the area is still not an exclusive competence as 
defined in Article 3. The areas in Article 3.1 are within the a priori 
exclusive Union competence. An area within shared competence where the 
Union has pre-empted the whole area can, in theory, be a shared competence 
again. This is because the Union can stop legislating within the area and 
withdraw the already adopted legislations. Therefore, a completely pre-
empted area cannot be equalized with an exclusive competence in Article 3 
TFEU.
29
  
 
The areas of research, technological development and space, development 
cooperation and humanitarian aid are explicitly mentioned in Articles 4.3 
and 4.4 TFEU. Within these areas, the competence stays with the Member 
States even in matters in which the Union has legislated to avoid pre-
emption in these particular areas.
30
 They are also commonly referred to as 
parallel competences.
31
      
 
Other excepted matters are essential State functions such as ensuring the 
territorial integrity of the State, the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of the national security of the Union Member States. This is 
regulated in Articles 4.2 TEU and 72, 73 and 77.4 TFEU. These matters fall 
under the area of freedom, security and justice in Article 4.2.j. The area 
cannot be fully regulated by the Union due to these Articles.
32
 
 
As earlier assessed Regulation 2016/1624 falls under Article 4.2.j TFEU. It 
is therefore important to make sure that Regulation 2016/1624 is compatible 
with Article 4.2 TEU and Articles 72, 73 and 77.4 TFEU. An assessment of 
this will be made under Title 3.3.  
  
 
 
                                                 
27
 Vranes, Erich, ”Die EU-Außenkompetenzen im Schnittpunkt von Europarecht, 
Völkerrecht und nationalem Recht”, Juristiche Blätter, Vol. 133, 2011, p. 14.  
28
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 Bradley (2014) pp. 108-109. 
31
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32
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2.1.3 Competence to Support, Coordinate or 
Supplement 
This category is found in Article 2.5 TFEU. These areas cannot be 
harmonized and do not prevail the Member States. The areas are stated in 
Article 6 TFEU and are protection and improvement of human health; 
industry; culture; tourism; education, vocational training, youth and sport; 
civil protection and administrative cooperation. Within this category, the 
Union can only adopt legal acts that are supported by the Treaties.
33
 
 
These three categories of competences cover most of the Union acts but 
there are also two areas that fall outside of these categories. The first one is 
the economic, employment and social policy. This area shall be coordinated 
in accordance with arrangements in the Treaties between the Union and the 
Member States, e.g. through guidelines, as stated in Article 2.3 and 5 
TFEU.
34
 
 
The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is the second area that 
does not fall within the three categories earlier mentioned. This is dealt with 
in Article 2.4 TFEU and Title V TEU. The decision-making within CFSP is 
done by the European Council and executed by the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy together with the European Parliament, 
the Commission and the CJEU.
35
 This is to give this area a more 
intergovernmental level.
36
   
 
The allocation of competences is an important area within Union law. 
However, the Union Treaties only regulate which and how the competences 
are conferred to the Union and its main institutions. Since the European 
Border and Coast Guard is an agency, a description must be given on how 
agencies is established and how the Union institutions can delegate 
competences upon its agencies. Therefore, the establishment of agencies and 
the delegation of competences to agencies is further examined in the 
following section.   
 
2.1.4 Delegation of Competences to Agencies 
of the European Union 
The European Border and Coast Guard is an agency of the Union. Agencies 
play an important institutional role in the Union today. They are often a big 
help to the Commission as the agencies can cover the more technical and 
bureaucratic part of the executive power. Agencies are also appreciated by 
the Member States since they prefer giving competences to the agencies 
where the Management Board consists of representatives from the Member 
                                                 
33
 Craig and De Búrca (2015) pp. 86-88. 
34
 Craig and De Búrca (2015) pp. 88-89. 
35
 Craig and De Búrca (2015) pp. 89-90. Bradley (2014) pp. 109-110. 
36
 Craig and De Búrca (2015) pp. 89-90. 
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States instead of expanding the Commission’s competences. The 
Commission represents the interest of the Union. Through agencies and the 
Management Board it is easier for Member States to make sure their own 
interests are considered.
37
 The Commission is supportive of agencies but 
they also argue for the limitation of agency powers as to not undermine the 
executive function of the Commission.
38
 
 
There is no official definition for agencies but they can all be defined as 
permanent bodies under Union public law that are established by the 
institutions through secondary legislation. All agencies have been 
established through a regulation
39
 and have their own legal personality.
40
 
Today there are about 34 Union agencies.
41
 
 
In regards to the establishment of agencies, no provision in the Treaties can 
be found that allows this. However, there are several provisions that take 
agencies and their powers for granted.
42
 Agencies are mentioned in Articles 
263, 265, 267, 277 TFEU.
43
 Since there is no explicit competence for the 
Union to establish agencies it must be assessed that an implied competence 
to do this exists.
44
  
 
The legal base for the establishment of agencies was first often claimed to 
be the so-called flexibility clause, Article 352 TFEU, and later the 
harmonisation clause, Article 114 TFEU. The use of these Articles has been 
accepted by the CJEU. The case law of today can be used to support that 
almost any sectorial provisions can be used as legal base when establishing 
agencies.
45
 For Regulation 2016/1624, Articles 77.2.b., 77.2.d and 79.2.c are 
used as the legal base. This should be regarded as in compliance with the 
case law of the CJEU.  
 
The competences of the agencies have been delegated to them by the 
Union.
46
 Delegation is regarded lawful, in so far as it is not expressly 
prohibited.
47
 Article 290 regulates the delegation of powers to the 
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Commission, but agencies are not mentioned. This seems to point to the 
conclusion that delegation of power cannot be made to agencies. Despite 
this, the agencies of the Union are well established and the delegation of 
power to them is an important factor for the effective functioning of the 
Union.
48
 Often, the Meroni doctrine is used to justify and explain under 
which conditions competences can be delegated to agencies. The doctrine 
stems from the case 9/56 Meroni but has been further developed through 
other cases.
49
 The Meroni doctrine has been discussed and interpreted in 
different ways by legal scholars. The most important conclusions in the case 
9/56 Meroni was that powers being delegated to an agency must be powers 
the delegating authority itself possesses.
50
  
 
A description of the allocation of competences, the establishment of 
agencies and the delegation of competences to the agencies have now been 
given, thereby the laying out of the descriptive parts for the first research 
question has been done.  
 
This leads to the second research question on whether the Agency has a 
responsibility to protect the fundamental rights for asylum-seekers. To 
answer this research question, the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers 
must be further described. In the following section, it is explained from 
where the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers derive and what they entail.  
 
2.2 Fundamental Rights of Asylum-
Seekers 
The term asylum stems from Greek and Latin and means place of refuge, 
sanctuary or safe from violence.
51
 Asylum today is usually used for the 
protection offered to people fleeing from persecution in their State of 
nationality. Asylum is also referred to as international protection. To be 
given such protection a person must qualify as a refugee.
52
  
 
The term refugee is defined in Article 1 in the Geneva Convention. A 
refugee is a person that has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion and is outside his or her State of nationality. A 
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refugee cannot make use of the protection in his or her State of nationality.
53
 
The time limit of events happening before January 1
st
, 1951 through the 
adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol) 
is not applicable anymore.
54
   
 
In Union law, international protection can also be given to persons facing 
the death penalty or execution, torture or serious and individual threat due to 
an external or internal armed conflict. Such persons qualify as people 
entitled to subsidiary protection.
55
 
 
This thesis deals with persons crossing the external borders as asylum-
seekers. This is not the same as a refugee since an assessment must be made 
before a person can be regarded a refugee.
56
 A migrant is a person who has 
left his or her State of origin. When moving to a new country the person will 
there be referred to as an immigrant.
57
 Both these terms are too wide for the 
scope of this thesis since they include economic migrants that are moving to 
the Union for work as well as students, trainees, volunteers, and other, so-
called legal migrants.
58
 No person is illegal and therefore the term “illegal 
immigrants” will not be used.59  
 
The most important fundamental right for asylum seekers is the principle of 
non-refoulement.
60
 This principle is found in Article 33 of the Geneva 
Convention. It is defined as a ban for all Contracting States to send a 
refugee back to a territory where the refugee’s life or freedom is in danger 
for any reasons qualifying the asylum seeker as a refugee. The non-
refoulement principle is the foundation for all other fundamental rights for 
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asylum seekers.
61
  
 
In ECHR, the non-refoulement principle is inherent in Article 3 on the 
prohibition of torture.
62
 The principle is also found in the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
63
 and International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)
64
.
65
 In Union Law, Article 19 in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) states the non-
refoulement principle.  
 
The right to non-refoulement is absolute in the ECHR, and should therefore 
be an absolute right within Union law as well.
66
 Article 19.2 in the Charter 
corresponds to Article 3 ECHR and must therefore be interpreted in the 
same way, this in accordance with Article 52.3 in the Charter. That the right 
to non-refoulement is absolute has been recognised by CJEU in the ruling 
C-404/15 Aranyosi
67
. This implies that a State must assess a person’s claim 
to be under international protection.
68
Article 19 in the Charter is applicable 
both on refugees as well as immigrants under subsidiary protection.
69
  
 
The non-refoulement principle entails a right to seek asylum.
70
 In the 
Charter the right to asylum is stated in Article 18. Roberta Mungianu, 
Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Copenhagen, 
argues that the non-refoulement principle also includes a responsibility 
outside State territory, when the State exercise de jure or de facto control, 
effective control, over places or borders. She supports these claims with 
case law from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
71
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Vladislava Stoyanova, post doc at Lund University, argues that the asylum 
procedure must be conducted on State territory to be regarded as fair and 
effective, since the applicant has the right to appeal the decision of the 
asylum procedure. An actual access to appeal in front of national courts can 
only be guaranteed if the asylum procedure is carried out on State territory. 
The asylum procedure can therefore not be conducted on the State’s borders 
or outside of the State territory, e.g. in international zones. The applicant is 
also entitled to legal aid and an interpreter.
72
  
 
The Geneva Convention does not contain any detailed provisions or 
standards for the assessment of refugee status.
73
 There are guidelines from 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
Executive Committee of the Programme of the High Commissioner 
(EXCOM) on asylum procedures but these are not binding. Case law from 
ECtHR only gives some directives on some aspects of the asylum procedure 
and its compliance with the non-refoulement principle.
74
     
 
This allows for a wide discretion among States on how to constitute the 
asylum procedure. In many States, the focus is no longer on fulfilling the 
principle of non-refoulement, instead the asylum procedure is designed to 
protect borders and assure that people that do not attain asylum get 
deported. This was highlighted by the accelerated asylum procedures that 
are getting more and more common throughout different States.
75
  
 
Two of the terrorists behind the Paris attacks in November 2015 entered 
Europe as asylum-seekers. They had been registered in Greece using 
fraudulent Syrian documents to get through border control. This has 
increased the pressure on performing thorough controls and attaining 
security at the external borders. Many asylum-seekers arrive with no or false 
documentation. Many of them also claim to have another nationality, 
especially Syrian, to speed up the asylum process and have a bigger chance 
of being granted asylum. To determine the nationality of poorly documented 
asylum seekers is one of the biggest challenges for the European Border and 
Coast Guard.
76
   
 
A description on the fundamental rights of asylum seekers is needed for the 
examination of the second research question in this thesis. The Union has a 
responsibility through the Treaties and the Charter to protect fundamental 
rights.
77
 The question remains, whether this protection is also applicable on 
the European Border and Coast Guard. A further assessment on this will be 
given in Chapter 4.  
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However, it must also be examined how the allocation of competences is 
affected by the responsibility of the Union to protect fundamental rights. 
Therefore, an analysis on the relationship between the allocation of 
competences and the responsibility to protect fundamental rights is carried 
out in the next section.   
 
2.3 Allocation of Competences and the 
Responsibility to Protect Fundamental 
Rights in Union Law 
The principle of conferral assures that the Union is not given too much 
power and becomes a supranational organisation. The principle protects the 
sovereignty of the Member States. How the competences are allocated in the 
Treaties can be described as a catalogue defining different policy areas and 
under which category of competence they lay.  
 
The Union’s right to act in regards to fundamental rights cannot be found 
within this catalogue. The two main sources for fundamental rights within 
the Union are the Charter and the general principles of the Union. The 
Charter became binding through the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 
and the general principles have been developed through the case law of the 
CJEU. In 1969, CJEU concluded that fundamental rights are an integral part 
of the general principles of Union law.
78
 Article 6 TEU states that the Union 
recognises the rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter. The same 
Article also states that the Charter shall not extend the competences of the 
Union. The application of the Charter is also limited in Article 51.1 to when 
Member States act within the scope of Union law. In regards to action of 
Union bodies, the Charter is applicable, but limited by the subsidiarity 
principle. Article 51.2 in the Charter also states that the Charter does not 
establish any new competences or task, or modify existing competences or 
tasks for the Union. The idea behind making the Charter binding was not to 
extend the competences of the Union.  
 
CJEU often go far to protect fundamental rights, sometimes even beyond 
what the Union’s political institutions have provided for in the Union legal 
order. Union fundamental rights reaches further than other Union law areas 
since it goes directly into domestic law and interpersonal relations. It opens 
a possibility for the Union to intrude in domestic law. The interaction 
between Article 5 TEU on conferred and allocated competences does not 
correspond to fundamental rights. The role the protection of fundamental 
rights has today seems to stretch the possibility for the Union to intervene.
79
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The Union can establish a level of protection in policy fields that are not 
within any of the competences of the Union in Articles 3-6 TFEU. Elise 
Muir, Associate Professor at Maastricht Faculty of Law, argues that this 
appears in three different situations. A level of protection in policy fields 
that are not within any of the Union competences can be argued to be 
established when fundamental rights are indirectly addressed in Union 
legislation. The second situation is when fundamental rights are directly 
mentioned in the Treaties, such as protection of data in Article 16 TFEU and 
protection against discrimination in Article 19 TFEU. This allocation of 
competence to legislate on the reach of Union anti-discrimination has been 
discussed and criticised. The third situation is when fundamental rights 
relates to areas of Union competences but these fundamental rights are not 
directly or expressly mentioned. This is often the case within the area of 
migration and criminal law. Instruments, such as regulations, directive or 
similar, implemented by the Union in these areas have a level of 
fundamental rights.
80
 
 
There is a tension between the doctrine of allocation of competences and the 
fundamental rights protection within the Union. The principle of conferred 
competences offers very little guidance in the field of Union fundamental 
rights.
81
 It is stated in Article 6.1 TEU as well as in Article 51.2 in the 
Charter that the provisions in the Charter shall not, in any way, extend the 
competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. It can however be 
argued that these provisions have little influence in practice.  
 
Edouard Dubout, professor of European Law at the University Paris-Est, 
argues that it is beyond doubt that the protection of fundamental rights 
exceeds the limits of the allocation of competences.
82
 Article 2 TEU states 
that the Union is founded on the respect for human rights. However, in 
Opinion 2/94 it was assessed, that the Union has little competence to 
actually protect fundamental rights.
83
 The more recent Opinion 2/13 also 
addressed the difficulties within Union law and the protection of 
fundamental rights.
84
 The Union has been given the wide aim to protect 
fundamental rights without the means to fulfil this aim.
85
 However, in order 
to fulfil the aim, the Union has in some aspects found the means. In the case 
law of CJEU several cases can be found were the Court allows for the 
application of Union law in order to protect fundamental rights even in 
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situations outside the scope of the competences of the Union.
86
 Some of this 
cases are 29/69 Stauder, 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 5/88 
Wachauf, C-260/89 ERT, C-555/07 Kücükdeveci and C-34/09 Ruiz 
Zambrano.
87
 This cases mostly deals with actions of the Member States, that 
are outside the competences of the Union, where the CJEU concludes that in 
this situations, Union law on fundamental rights protection must be 
followed by the Member State.  
 
The European Border and Coast Guard is a body of the Union, not a 
Member State, and it must be assessed whether the obligations on the 
Agency to protect fundamental rights entitles the Agency to act in areas of 
national competences in order to fulfil this obligation. In order to do such an 
assessment, it must first be assessed if the Agency has a responsibility to 
protect fundamental rights. Within this thesis, the focus is put on 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. This is assessed in Chapter 4. A 
further assessment on the possibility for the Union to act outside its 
competences due to the responsibility to protect fundamental rights will be 
carried out in Chapter 5.  
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3 The European Border and 
Coast Guard 
3.1 Background of the European Border 
and Coast Guard 
The European Border and Coast Guard is an agency of the European Union. 
The Agency was earlier known as the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the 
Member States of the Union (Frontex). It was established through a 
regulation adopted in 2004, which was later amended in 2007 and 2011.
88
 
Throughout this thesis the earlier Frontex regulation will be referred to as 
the 2011 Frontex Regulation
89
. Regulation 2016/1624 replaced the earlier 
Frontex Regulation, expanded the competences of the Agency and its name 
was changed to the European Border and Coast Guard.
90
   
 
The European Border and Coast Guard is still referred to as Frontex and the 
constitutional setting remained the same. The Agency is a decentralised, 
regulatory and independent Union body with legal personality.
91
 Mungianu 
argues that Frontex has been delegated the Union’s international legal 
personality, since the Agency can conclude working agreements with 
national authorities of third countries.
92
 
 
The Agency is represented by an executive director, Febrice Leggeri since 
2015.
93
 The executive director is appointed by the Management Board after 
proposal from the Commission.
94
 The executive director shall be 
independent and not take instructions from any government or body. 
However, the executive director must act within the competences of the 
Commission.
95
 The Management Board is responsible for taking the 
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strategic decisions of the Agency. It consists of one representative from each 
Member State and two representatives from the Commission.
96
    
 
The European Border and Coast Guard consists of the Agency and the 
Member States’ national authorities responsible for border management and 
border control. The European integrated border management shall be a 
shared responsibility between them.
97
 This is the first time the concept of 
“shared responsibility” on border control is explicitly used in Union law.98  
 
3.2 The Tasks of the European Border and 
Coast Guard 
The Agency has kept most of its earlier tasks but has been given a more 
supervisory role and wider competences.
99
 This is illustrated by the new 
competence of the European Border and Coast Guard to establish a 
“technical and operational strategy for European integrated border 
management” which the national authorities must comply with.100 This 
shows that the Agency has been given a more supreme role and an increased 
influence on border management within the whole Union.  
 
The tasks of the Agency are to monitor migratory flows and, based on the 
collected data, set up risk analyses to predict the numbers and the 
movements of the asylum-seekers. This is used to decide where and when 
joint operations should be set up.
101
 Vulnerability assessments are a new 
task. Through vulnerability assessments the ability of a Member State to 
tackle challenges at their external borders are examined.
102
 These 
assessments can lead to binding recommendations from the executive 
director. If the recommendations are not followed the Council can adopt an 
implementing measure requiring the Member State to cooperate with the 
Agency.
103
 This is the most controversial new feature in Regulation 
2016/1624 and is commonly referred to as the “right to intervene”.104 See 
more about this under Title 3.3.4 “Situations at the external border requiring 
urgent action”. 
                                                 
96
 Regulation 2016/1624, Articles 62-63. 
97
 Regulation 2016/1624, Articles 3.1 and 5.1. 
98
 International Commission of Jurists, ECRE and Amnesty International: “Joint briefing on 
the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation”, retrieved from 
<www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Docs_2016/ReportsBriefings/EBCGReg_Joint_briefing.p
df>, accessed 2017-03-02.  
99
 Peers (2015). 
100
 Regulation 2016/1624 Article 3.  
101
 Casella Colombeau, Sara. (2017). “Frontex and its role in the European Border 
Regime”, in: Migration, squatting and radical autonomy, by Mudu, Pierpaolo and 
Chattopadhyay, Sutapa (eds.), Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2017, pp. 40-
41. 
102
 Regulation 2016/1624, Article 3.1. Rosenfeldt (2016). 
103
 Regulation 2016/1624 Articles 13 and 19.  
104
 Regulation 2016/1624 Article 19. Rosenfeldt (2016). 
 28 
Wider and more official competences have been given to the Agency to 
perform search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea during 
border surveillance operations since Regulation 2016/1624 integrates the 
Sea External Borders Regulation.
105
 
106
 The Member States can receive 
technical and operational support with migration management at hot spot 
areas from the Agency through migration management support teams. The 
teams consist of European Border Guard teams, European return 
interventions teams or experts from the Agency and they can assist with e.g.   
screening, registering and providing information to the asylum-seekers.
107
 
Liaison officers are placed in the Member States acting on behalf of the 
Agency working towards cooperation and communication between the 
Agency and the Member States.
108
 Liaison officers can also be placed in 
third countries to monitor the management of the external borders.
109
  
 
The European Border and Coast Guard coordinates and organises joint 
operations at the request of a Member State. The Agency can also assist 
Member States by launching rapid border interventions when the Member 
State is facing specific and disproportionate challenges.
110
 The rapid border 
interventions are launched within a shorter amount of time than the joint 
operations since the executive director only has three working days to set up 
the operational plan and the border guards are deployed within five days 
from the rapid reaction pool.
111
 The rapid reaction pool is a new feature of 
Regulation 2016/1624 and consists of 1500 border guards that are put at the 
disposal of the Agency from the Member States.
112
 To ensure coordination 
and organisation of return operations as well as providing technical and 
operational assistance in form of return interventions is also within the 
Agency’s mandate, but only at the request of the Member State.113 For all 
operations, one or more experts from the Agency are placed as coordination 
officers in the Member State to assure that the operation is correctly 
conducted and in accordance with the operational plan.
114
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European Border and Coast Guard teams consist of guest officers seconded 
from the different Member States and are deployed in joint operations, rapid 
border interventions and migration management support teams. Member 
States shall make border guards available so that they can be used in 
operations.
115
 For return interventions tailor-made European return 
intervention teams are used.
116
 They are gathered from the pools of forced-
return monitors, forced return escorts and return specialists.
117
 With 
Regulation 2016/1624 the Agency is now entitled to own its own 
equipment.
118
 Because of this the Agency has become less dependent on the 
Member States.
119
 The European Border and Coast Guards teams can only 
act under the instructions of the host Member State.
120
 The coordinating 
officer can also communicate views from the Agency on these instructions. 
These views must be considered and followed as far as possible.
121
  
 
In regards to third countries the Agency can facilitate and encourage, in 
some cases even coordinate, technical and operational cooperation between 
Member States and third countries. The Agency may cooperate with the 
national authorities of the third countries on returns and conclude working 
agreements with the national authorities of the third countries.
122
 The 
working agreements clearly state that they are not international treaties and 
do not fulfil any international obligations of the Union.
 123
  
 
The enhanced mandate of the European Border and Coast Guard focuses on 
controlling the management of the external borders to increase the security 
within the Union.
124
 The Paris attacks in 2015 were committed by people 
crossing the borders pretending to be Syrian refugees, this raised awareness 
of which danger asylum-seekers can bring.
125
 The increased security and 
control together with other measures is causing fewer asylum-seekers 
making their way into the Union. This results in fewer asylum applications. 
The massive number of asylum applications and the obligation to provide 
food and shelter to the asylum applicants has been a burden for the Member 
States. That fewer asylum-seekers reaches the Union can be regarded as 
motivation for the Member States to unify and adopt Regulation 2016/1624 
within only a year, despite border control usually being a sensitive subject 
for which the Member States do not want to confer competences to the 
Union.
126
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In Steve Peers’ assessment on the proposal for the new European Border 
and Coast Guard in December 2015, he states that two major flaws can be 
found. One is in regards to the allocation of competences between the Union 
and the Member States. The European Border and Coast Guard is given too 
wide competences within the area of border controls. They are exceeding 
the Union’s competences, which is politically unprincipled. At the same 
time, not enough is done within the area of asylum and fundamental rights 
since not enough focus is put on humanitarian needs.
127
 To see whether this 
statement holds with the final version of Regulation 2016/1624 an 
assessment needs to be done, which is given below. Much points to that 
Steve Peers’ statement on the proposal also holds true for the final version 
of Regulation 2016/1624, in that the new European Border and Coast Guard 
“…seek to save the Schengen system, at the expense of the refugees”.128   
 
3.3 Allocation of Competences and the 
European Border and Coast Guard 
With the new expanded mandate of the European Border and Coast Guards 
new concerns have been raised that too wide competences have been 
conferred. This problem has been raised by European law scholars, the 
International Commission of Jurists, the European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles (ECRE), Amnesty International and UNHCR. UNHCR 
recommended a clearer, more coherent and pragmatic distribution of 
responsibilities between the Union and the Member States.
129
  
 
Many Member States saw the new competences of the European Border and 
Coast Guard as a violation to national sovereignty.
130
 The enhanced 
involvement is by some seen as steps towards making the Union a 
supranational organisation.
131
 It must therefore be examined whether the 
Agency is acting outside the conferred competences upon the Union. In 
order to carry out this examination, it must be assessed in which category 
the competences of the Agency are. For this the legal base of Regulation 
2016/1624 must be assessed.  
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3.3.1 The Legal Base of Regulation 2016/1624 
The legal base for Regulation 2016/1624 is stated to be Article 77.2.b, 
77.2.d and 79.2.c TFEU. For this thesis, these Articles will be accepted as 
the legal base for Regulation 2016/1624. A complete legal assessment 
whether these are the correct legal bases are outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
Article 77.2.b allows for checks and monitoring of persons crossing the 
external borders, while Article 77.2.d allows the adoption of measures to 
gradually establish an integrated management system for external borders. 
In Article 79.2.c the adoption of measures to remove and expel persons 
residing without permission is allowed. These provisions are all under the 
Title V Area of freedom, security and justice and under the competence of 
the Union. 
 
In regards to the allocation of competences, the area of freedom, security 
and justice is found within the shared competence in Article 4.2.j TFEU. 
Shared competence entitles the Union to legislate as far as it is in 
compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. However, 
limitations on the Union’s competence in this area can be found in Article 
4.2 TEU and Articles 72,73 and 77.4 TFEU.
132
  
 
Article 4.2 TEU obligates the Union to respect essential State functions such 
as ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order 
and safeguarding national security. Article 72 TFEU puts extra emphasis on 
that within the area of freedom, security and justice the Union’s action shall 
have no effect on the competences of the Member States in maintaining law 
and order and safeguarding national security. This includes border 
control.
133
 Article 73 TFEU allows for the cooperation between Member 
States in matters of safeguarding national security. Finally, Article 77.4 
states that the Union shall not affect the geographical demarcation of the 
Member States’ borders. These essential State functions belong to the sole 
competence of the Member States. A further assessment on these 
competences is carried out in Title 3.3.2.  
 
Another area that is outside the shared competences of the Union and the 
Member States are executive powers. Executive powers, such as allowing 
entry, issuing asylum and return decisions, belong solely to the competence 
of the Member States. The Union cannot interfere in these powers.
134
 
Whether the Agency is interfering with these executive powers is assessed 
in Title 3.3.2.  
 
The provision that caused most debate and concern in Regulation 2016/1624 
was Article 19, Situations at the external borders requiring urgent action. 
This competence is commonly referred to as “the right to intervene”. 
Through Article 19 the Agency can intervene in situations where the 
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Member States is unable or unwilling to act. This despite that the Member 
State has not requested assistance.
135
 A further description and assessment 
on Article 19 and the “right to intervene” is given in Title 3.3.3. 
 
To assess whether the Agency is acting outside the conferred competences, 
these exceptions to the shared competences and the “right to intervene” in 
Article 19 will be further examined and compared to which competences the 
Agency have. Firstly, the essential State functions will be further examined. 
An analysis will be carried out whether the Agency is interfering with these 
essential state functions to such a degree that it is a violation to the Union 
Treaties.   
 
3.3.2 Essential State Functions  
The limitation on the Union’s competence in Article 4.2 TEU and 72 TFEU 
is the most important exceptions to the Union’s competence within the area 
of freedom, security and justice. 
 
3.3.2.1 Article 4.2 TEU and Article 72 TFEU as 
Expressions of Member State’s Competences 
 
Article 4.2 TEU is an important provision. It states that the Union shall 
respect the essential functions of the states, such as ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national 
security. However, it must be assessed whether Article 4.2 TEU regulates 
competences of the Member States. In Sayn-Wittgenstein the CJEU stated 
that Article 4.2 implies that the Union must respect the “national identity” of 
the Member States and assure that it is not threatened by Union law.
136
 It 
has been argued that “national identity” is not the same as Member State 
competence and that the Article does not have any effect on the allocation of 
competences.
137
 The CJEU has e.g. in the case Malgozata allowed 
exceptions to the free movement principle to protect the Lithuanian 
language since the language was regarded as an important part of 
Lithuania’s identity.138 
 
The exact role and impact of Article 4.2 TEU on the allocation of 
competences is hard to define, due to the wording of “shall respect”.139 
However, one can argue that Article 4.2 TEU limits the competences of the 
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Union.
140
 Since the Article has been used by the CJEU, this implies that it 
shall be given legal force.
141
 How the Article has been interpreted and its 
historical context, also points towards that it affects the allocation of 
competences.
142
 Article 4.2 TEU is also placed between Article 4.1 TEU, 
that states that competences that has not been conferred to the Union stays 
within the Member States, and Article 5 TEU that defines the principle of 
conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality. This strengthens the link between 
Article 4.2 TEU and the allocation of competences.
143
 It is settled that the 
Article limits the application of Union law.
144
  
 
Through this it can be argued that the areas within Article 4.2 TEU are 
outside the application of Union law. This implies that the Union has no 
competence in these areas. Article 4.1 TEU states that competences not 
belonging to the Union, belong to the Member States. It must thereby be 
assessed that Article 4.2 TEU expresses exclusive competences of the 
Member States. The interpretations, historical context and the placement of 
the Article strengthen the argument that the Article is an expression of the 
allocation of competences. If the Union intervenes with the territorial 
integrity, maintenance of law and order or safeguarding of national security, 
as stated in Article 4.2 TEU, this must be considered a violation to the 
allocation of competences. This since it has here been assessed that the 
Article expresses competences belonging to the Member States.  
 
Article 72 TFEU states that the competence of the Union to act within the 
area of freedom, security and justice shall not affect the Member States 
responsibilities to maintain law and order and to safeguard internal security. 
Since it is stated that it is the responsibility of the Member States to carry 
out these functions, they must be regarded as within the competences of the 
Member States. This provision is very similar to Article 4.2 TEU and it 
would be in line with the above argumentation to assess that also in Article 
72 is the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security within the competence of the Member State.  
 
3.3.2.2 Influence of the Agency on Essential State 
Functions 
Since the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security include border control, it can be argued that a European system of 
border guards that works at the disposition of the European Border and 
Coast Guard would be a violation of the allocation of competences.
 145
 The 
Union can establish rules on border controls but it cannot be in control of 
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the borders or require the Member States to carry out operations. This would 
violate Article 4.2 TEU and Article 72 TFEU.
146
 To avoid such a violation 
Regulation 2016/1624 clearly states that the Member States shall establish 
national strategies for integrated border management, the Member States 
shall retain primary responsibility for the management of their external 
borders and that the European Border and Coast Guard teams are to follow 
the instructions of the host Member State.
147
 The host Member State is the 
State where the operation is carried out.
148
  
 
However, it can be questioned whether these competences actually remain 
within the primary responsibility and sole competence of the Member 
States. The European Border and Coast Guard establishes a technical and 
operational strategy for European integrated border management.
149
 The 
national strategies of the Member States must be in line with this technical 
and operational strategy and follow the Agency’s definition of European 
integrated border management.
150
 The management of the external borders 
by the Member States must also be in accordance with the technical and 
operational strategy.
151
  
 
For every operation, carried out by the Agency, an operational plan is 
established.
152
 The operational plan can be seen as a decision made at Union 
level since it is adopted by Frontex and the Member States.
153
 The 
operational plan is established by the Agency and the Member State 
together but it still gives the Agency a big influence in how the Member 
State shall maintain law and order and safeguard internal security at their 
external borders.
154
 The instructions of the host Member State must be in 
accordance with the operational plan and the Agency may communicate 
views on instructions which the host Member State shall follow as far as 
possible.
155
  
 
Through the operational and technical strategy together with the operational 
plan, the European Border and Coast Guard is given a very big influence on 
the Member States’ maintenance of law and order and safeguarding of 
national security at their external borders. Therefore, Regulation 2016/1624 
is violating Article 4.2. TEU, Article 72 TFEU and the allocation of 
competences.  
 
As stated in Title 3.3.1 Article 73 TFEU is also an exception to the 
competences of the Union within the area of freedom, security and justice. 
An assessment must thereby also be made in regards to Article 73 TFEU. 
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Article 73 TFEU entitles the national authorities of Member States to 
cooperate in administrative measures regarding national security. This, 
however, does not entail that the Union cannot cooperate and coordinate in 
matters regarding national security as long as the Union is acting within its 
own competence.
156
 The Agency still has a large influence on border 
management of the Member States through the technical and operational 
strategy for European integrated border management.
157
 The Agency is 
therefore not only reinforcing, assessing and coordinating national forces; 
they are setting up the framework for how the border management in the 
Union shall be conducted by the Member States. By these means, they are 
taking control of the Member States and assuring that they act efficiently 
according to Union standards.
158
 The Member States are still allowed to 
cooperate among themselves outside of the Union but even then, they must 
act in compliance with the Agency’s strategy and tasks.159 The Agency 
therefore gets a supreme role and it can be argued that the Member States’ 
discretionary powers in border control are taken from them.
160
 
 
The last of the exceptions to the Union competence within the area of 
freedom, security and justice is Article 77.4 TFEU that states that the Union 
cannot affect the Member States competence on the geographical 
demarcation of their borders, in accordance with international law. Nothing 
in Regulation 2016/1624 affects this.  
 
The conclusion in regards to the essential state functions in Article 4.2 TEU 
and 72 TFEU is that Regulation 2016/1624 interferes with them to such a 
degree that a violation of the allocation of competences in the Union treaties 
must be assessed. Also, in regards to Article 73 TFEU is the competences of 
the Agency too wide. This is however only one aspect of the competences in 
Regulation 2016/1624 that can be in violation of the Union Treaties. In the 
next section is an assessment made in regards to the executive powers of the 
Member States, such as the issuing of decisions of entry, asylum and return.  
 
3.3.3 The Executive Powers of the Member 
States 
During 2015 only every fifth migrant was properly identified by border 
controls.
161
 Several Member States could not administer the high numbers 
of asylum-seekers and used a so called “wave-through” approach letting the 
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asylum-seekers pass the external borders and giving them the possibility to 
move freely in the Union, since the internal borders have been removed.
162
 
To tackle this problem the Agency’s role in migration management has been 
widened.
163
 
 
Allowing entry and issuing asylum and return decisions are executive 
powers that are strictly within the Member State’s own exclusive 
competence. Since the Agency can support the Member States in border 
management the Agency has great influence and can be regarded as 
interfering with these executive powers. In Regulation 2016/1624 almost no 
detailed provisions are given on how and to what degree the Agency can 
give support in this regard. This is something that raises a serious concern 
on which influence the competences of the Agency can have.
164
 
 
The competences of the European Border and Coast Guard that are 
problematic in regards to the Member States’ executive powers is related to 
joint operations, migration management teams and return operations.  
 
In joint operations, it can be argued that the Agency is interfering with 
allowing entry and issuing asylum decisions. Joint operations are launched 
at the request of a Member State to face upcoming challenges, illegal 
immigration, present or future threats to the external border, handling cross-
border crime and to provide technical and operational assistance to control 
the borders.
165
 As assessed earlier the European Border and Coast Guard has 
a big influence on the handling of the external borders due to the technical 
and operational strategy and their big influence on the operational plan. In 
joint operations, the operational plan is drawn up by the executive director 
of the Agency, and the host Member State must agree to the plan.
166
 The 
operational plan shall include procedures to direct persons in need of 
international protection, asylum-seekers, to the competent national 
authorities for appropriate assistance.
167
 In this provision, no limitations on 
these procedures can be found. It can be argued that there is a big risk that 
these procedures will in practice amount to the European Border and Coast 
Guard teams allowing the asylum-seekers entry to the host Member State. 
Since it is stated that only people in need of international protection are to 
be protected, it can also be argued that this entitles the Agency to make an 
assessment on which persons need international protection, or expressed 
differently, which persons are entitled to go through an asylum procedure. 
Only the Member State is allowed to assess who can be allowed entrance to 
their territory and who can apply for asylum, since these are executive 
powers of the Member States. This is one example on how the Agency is 
interfering with the executive powers of the Member State to such a degree 
that it cannot be regarded as compatible with the allocation of competences.      
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A similar problem arises in the migration management support teams. 
Migrations management support teams can be requested by a Member State 
that is facing disproportionate migratory challenges at particular hot spot 
areas of their external borders due to large, mixed migratory flows. The 
request can be made to the European Border and Coast Guard as well as 
other agencies, such as European Asylum Support Office (EASO).
168
 Hot 
spot areas are areas where the Member States and the Union cooperate to 
manage an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge due to 
a large increase of arriving migrants at the external borders.
169
 The 
executive director sets up a reinforcement package that is to be agreed upon 
by the concerned Member States.
170
 The Commission sets up the terms for 
the coordination between the agencies and Member States.
171
 The European 
Border and Coast Guard can support the Member States in identification, 
registration, debriefing and fingerprinting of the third country nationals.
172
 
The Agency can also provide information and refer the asylum-seekers to 
the competent national authority. The provision does state that this must be 
done in full respect for fundamental rights but once again no limitation on 
these procedures is set in regards to the allocation of competences.  
 
These procedures can be used for allowing entry and will have a big impact 
on the asylum procedure of an asylum-seeker since it is the Agency that 
identifies, registers and debriefs the asylum-seeker. Once again it can be 
argued that the influence of the Agency on the issuing of entry decisions and 
the asylum procedure is too big and not in compliance with the allocation of 
competences. It is also argued by Steve Peers, that the provisions for the 
European Border and Coast Guard in regards to migration management 
support teams do not clarify that decisions on asylum and return are within 
the sole competence of the Member States.
173
 
 
Return operations will be made more efficient and coherent through the 
establishment of a European Return Office within the Agency. The 
European Return Office will organise European Return Intervention Teams 
that will return illegally staying third country nationals. A standard 
European travel document for return will be set up to ensure a wider 
acceptance of returnees by third countries.
174
    
 
The Agency is not allowed to enter into the merits of the return decisions.
175
 
The return decisions cannot be altered in any way, as this decision is still 
within the competence of the Member States.
176
 Unlike the provisions 
regarding joint operations and migration management support teams, it is 
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clearly stated, in Article 28.1 in Regulation 2016/1624, that the issuing of 
return decisions is within the sole competence of the Member State. 
However, it can still be argued that the Agency has a big influence on the 
return operations. Migration management support teams are allowed to offer 
technical and operational assistance and prepare and organise return 
operations.
177
 The Agency shall draw up a rolling operational plan for return 
operations. In this rolling operational plan the Agency can decide, on its 
own initiative, to include the dates and destinations of the return operations 
the Agency itself considers necessary.
178
 On its own initiative, the Agency 
can also propose to Member States to coordinate or organise return 
operations.
179
 This does give the Agency a great influence on when, how 
and how many return operations shall be organised. A demand for a high 
number of return operations can influence the Member States to issue more 
return decisions. Because of this the influence of the European Border and 
Coast Guard on the Member State’s executive power to issue return 
decisions can be regarded as problematic in regards to the allocation of 
competence.   
 
The European Border and Coast Guard has too big an influence on the 
Member State’s executive powers to issue entry and asylum decisions. 
These executive powers belong to the sole competence of the Member 
States and the influence the Agency has cannot be regarded as compatible 
with the allocation of competences and a violation the Union Treaties.  
 
The issuing of return decisions is also an executive power belonging solely 
to the Member States. In Regulation 2016/1624 it is clearly stated that the 
Agency cannot enter into the merits of return decisions.
180
 It can, however, 
still be argued that the Agency has an influence on the issuing of return 
decisions, an influence that can be regarded as problematic in regards to the 
allocation of competences.   
 
During the negotiations, concerns were raised in regard to a new 
competence of the Agency. This competence is commonly referred to as the 
“right to intervene”.181 In Regulation 2016/1624 this is found in Article 19 
and the right to intervene occurs in “Situations at the external border 
requiring urgent action”. In the next section this competence will be further 
described and assessed.  
 
3.3.4 Situations at the External Borders 
Requiring Urgent Action 
Regulation 2016/1624 introduces the so called “right to intervene” for the 
European Border and Coast Guard in situations at the external border 
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requiring urgent action. This entitles the Agency to intervene in situations 
where the Member State is unable or unwilling to act and has not requested 
assistance.
182
 The main reason to the establishment of this Article is that 
Greece did not have enough capacity to handle the high inflow of 
migrants.
183
 This provision has been the cause of heavy debates due to its 
very sensitive politically nature. The provision awakens memories of the 
Second World War when foreign forces entered sovereign States’ territories 
without their consent.  The “right to intervene” is seen as a threat to the 
sovereignty of the Member States.
184
 It can also be seen as a violation of 
Article 4.2 TEU that explicitly states that the Union shall ensure the 
territorial integrity of the State. As assessed in Title 3.3.2.1, Article 4.2 TEU 
shall be regarded as expressing competences of the Member States.  
 
A situation at the external border requiring urgent action occurs when a 
Member State did not follow the recommendation after a vulnerability 
assessment or is facing specific and disproportionate challenges at the 
external borders without requesting or supporting joint operation, rapid 
border intervention or migration management support teams from the 
European Border and Coast Guard.
185
  
 
Through an implementing act of the Council, following a proposal from the 
Commission, the Agency is authorised to take various measures which is 
binding upon the Member State. The measures can enfold rapid border 
interventions, migration management support teams at hot spot areas, joint 
operations, use of technical equipment or to organise return interventions.
186
  
 
In order to be able to carry out the measures of the implementing decision, 
an operational plan must be drawn up. For the operational plan the Member 
State’s consent is required.187 It can be regarded that the Member State has a 
duty to consent to the operational plan since the Member State must comply 
with the implementing decision. After giving consent, the operation is under 
the host Member State’s command and control and the host Member State 
can therefore be held responsible, liable, for the operation. Rosenfeldt, 
Research Assistant and PhD candidate at University of Passau, argues that 
since the consent of the Member State is required for the operational plan, 
no real “right to intervene” is established.188  
 
A sanction system has been established through the amendments of Article 
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29 in the Schengen Borders Code
189
. A Member State that does not consent 
to the operational plan after an implementing decision has been adopted can 
temporarily be excluded from the Schengen area.
190
 Article 29 in the 
Schengen Borders Code gives neighbouring Member States the possibility 
to close their internal border when the actions of another Member State can 
set the functioning of the Schengen area at risk or cause a serious threat to 
public policy or internal security. A sanction for not showing solidarity has 
been established.
191
 In Article 80 TFEU it is stated that the principle of 
solidarity governs the Union’s asylum law and that measures to give effect 
to this principle can be adopted.  
 
Since the consent of the Member State to the operation plan is required, no 
real “right to intervene” is established and a violation to the allocation of 
competences cannot be assessed. However, the implementing decision from 
the Council is binding upon to the Member State and a sanction has been 
introduced, that can be used against the Member States that does not consent 
to the operational plan.
192
 Article 19.8 also states that the concerned 
Member State shall comply with the Council decision. This can be used to 
argue that no real right for the Member State to not consent to the 
operational plan exists. The Member State is put under pressure and 
threatened by the sanctions. In practice the Member State is thereby forced 
to consent to the operational plan. The Member State must let the European 
Border and Coast Guard and concerned Member States enter its territory 
and allow the measures in the Council decision to be carried out. Through 
this, the Union is not ensuring the territorial integrity of the State and 
violating Article 4.2 TEU. This makes Article 19 on situations at the 
external borders requiring urgent action highly problematic in regards to the 
allocation of competences.   
 
3.4 Conclusions on the Competences of 
the Agency 
In this Chapter, it has been assessed that the Agency violates Article 4.2 
TEU and 72 TFEU. The competences of the Agency are too wide in regards 
to Article 73 TFEU. In the executive powers of the Member States to issue 
decisions on entry and asylum, the interference of the Agency is a violation 
the Treaties. The influence of the Agency on the issuing of return decisions, 
shall be regarded as problematic in regards to the allocation of competences. 
Lastly, Article 19 in Regulation 2016/1624 is argued to be highly 
problematic in regards to the allocation of competences and might violate 
                                                 
189
 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of 
operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union, OJ L 189/93, 27 June 2014. 
190
 Regulation 2016/1624 Article 19.10. 
191
 Rosenfeldt (2016). 
192
 Rosenfeldt (2016). 
 41 
the Union Treaties.  
 
The European Border and Coast has through this been delegated 
competences that the Union institutions does not possess. Thereby is the 
Meroni doctrine not followed. In regards to the delegation, it must thereby 
be assessed that it has not been done correctly.  
 
It must be assessed that Regulation 2016/1624 violates the Union treaties. 
The competences that has been regarded in the Chapter and the interference 
of the Agency are not in compliance with the allocation of competences and 
the Union Treaties. The conclusion can be drawn to that if the legality of the 
expanded competences in Regulation 2016/1624 were to be reviewed by 
CJEU as in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, the CJEU would conclude 
the Regulation void in line with Article 264 TFEU. The expanded mandate 
in Regulation 2016/1624 would be considered a violation to the Union 
Treaties. 
 
Therefore, the first research question is answered. In the next Chapter, focus 
will be on the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers and the objective is to 
answer the second research question on whether the European Border and 
Coast Guard has a responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of 
asylum-seekers.   
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4 The Responsibility to Protect 
Fundamental Rights of 
Asylum-Seekers 
The responsibility of the European Border and Coast Guard to protect 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers is an important question. Strong 
criticism has been directed towards Regulation 2016/1624 since it does not 
clearly state what responsibility the Agency has, to protect these 
fundamental rights. Concerns regarding this have been raised by 
organisations such as UNHCR and Amnesty International.
193
 Steve Peers 
has stated that the accountability of the Agency for violations of 
fundamental rights is an issue.
194
 This question is of importance since 
without a responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers, 
the Agency cannot be required to assure that the fundamental rights of 
asylum-seekers are being upheld and not violated. In this thesis, only the 
question on whether the Agency has a responsibility to protect the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers is assessed. A further examination on 
whether the Agency in its current actions is violating fundamental rights of 
asylum-seekers is outside the scope of this thesis.     
 
In order to make an assessment on the responsibility of the European Border 
and Coast Guard to protect the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers, 
several legal sources within Union law as well as within international law 
must be regarded. To make it easier for the reader to follow the 
argumentation a clear division has been made within this Chapter. In Title 
4.1, only descriptions of the legal sources are given. This part is further 
divided into several subparts, describing the legal sources one at a time. In 
the next part, Title 4.2, the argumentation on whether the legal source can be 
used to argue that the Agency has a responsibility to protect fundamental 
rights of asylum seekers is presented. This part is divided into the same 
subparts as Title 4.1. 
 
4.1 Description of the Legal Sources on 
the Responsibility to Protect 
Fundamental Rights  
In this part of the thesis, the different sources in international law and Union 
law will be described. They have been divided into different subparts. 
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Firstly, the legal sources within international law will be described; 
secondly, the legal sources within Union law.  
4.1.1 International Law 
International law is an important source in regards to fundamental rights. 
Within this part, different legal sources in international law that deal with 
fundamental rights of asylum seekers will be described. 
 
4.1.1.1 The Geneva Convention 
The Geneva Convention is the most important Convention in regards to 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. In Article 33 in this Convention, the 
non-refoulement principle is stated. As described earlier, all fundamental 
rights for asylum-seekers derive from the non-refoulement principle.  
 
However, the Union is not a Party to the Geneva Convention.
195
 The 
Convention can therefore, not be used as ground for stating that the 
European Border and Coast Guard has a responsibility to act in compliance 
with the non-refoulement principle. With only this Convention as source, it 
cannot be argued that the Agency has a responsibility to protect the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. However, the non-refoulement 
principle is stated in other sources of international law.  
 
4.1.1.2 International Customary Law and Jus Cogens 
International customary law are practices of international law that are well 
established and used by several states and organisations. However, 
customary international law can be superseded if special customary law is 
developed. Customary international law is also superseded by the 
conclusion of treaties.
196
  
 
Jus cogens refers to parts of customary international law that cannot be 
superseded. Jus cogens can roughly be translated into “compelling law”.197 
A principle or norm that is jus cogens is a peremptory norm of international 
law that is binding on States and international organisations. In regards to 
this thesis, it is important to put extra attention to the fact that also 
international organisations are bound by jus cogens.
198
  
 
This implies that the Union, being an international organisation, is bound by 
principles or norms that are jus cogens and must act in accordance with this 
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principle at all times.
199
 For a principle to be jus cogens it must be 
customary international law and opinio juris. A principle or norm is opinio 
juris when it is practiced by States and it must be assessed that the States 
themselves considers the principle or norm being binding due to it being jus 
cogens.
200
 In title 4.2.1.2, an assessment is made on whether the non-
refoulement principle is jus cogens.  
 
Within the source of international customary law, attention must also be 
paid to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which is another 
important source within international law. It deals with conflicts between 
treaties and defines the concept of international customary law.
 201
 Article 
53 in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
202
 states that a treaty 
that conflicts with jus cogens becomes void and terminates. 
 
 
  
4.1.1.3 Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organisation 
Within international law, guidance on whether the European Border and 
Coast Guard is responsible to protect fundamental rights can be found in the 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO) that 
are adopted by the International Law Commission. The International Law 
Commission is a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly. ARIO does 
not reflect international customary law and is therefore not legally binding 
but it has been used by national courts and ECtHR. It therefore has legal 
value.
203
  
 
Article 7 in ARIO states that if an organ to a State is placed at the disposal 
of an international organisation, the international organisation can be held 
responsible for that organ’s conduct if they exercise effective control over 
that conduct.
204
 It must therefore be assessed whether the Union, being an 
international organisation and acting through the European Border and 
Coast Guard, exercises effective control over the conduct of the border 
guards in a European Border Guard Teams, and other teams of the Agency 
within their operations. The border guards in the European Border and 
Coast Guard teams consists of border guards from border guard organs of 
the Member States. Thereby, Article 7 can be applicated on the actions of 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. An assessment of whether 
the Agency has effective control in the operations of the Agency will be 
made in Title 4.2.1.3. 
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4.1.2 Union Law 
Also within Union law, several different sources must be regarded to make a 
complete assessment on the responsibility of the European Border and Coast 
Guard to protect fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. As in the previous 
part, the different sources are divided into subparts. 
 
4.1.2.1 The Charter 
The Union takes responsibility to protect fundamental rights through the 
Charter.
205
  
 
The non-refoulement principle is stated in the Charter in Article 19. The 
Charter is primary law and shall be followed when the Union is acting.
206
 
Article 51.1 in the Charter clearly states that the provisions in the Charter 
are addressed to the bodies of the Union. Since the European Border and 
Coast Guard is a body of the Union, the Charter is applicable to all actions 
of the Agency. However, the principle of subsidiarity must be regarded.
207
 
A further analysis on the subsidiarity principle will be carried out in Title 
4.2.2.1. 
 
4.1.2.2 General Principles 
The Union takes responsibility to protect fundamental rights through the 
general principles of Union law. The general principles sit below primary 
law such as the Union Treaties and the Charter but above secondary law 
such as regulations. They can be used to interpret Treaty Articles and have 
an important role within Union law.
208
 The general principles have been 
developed through case law of the CJEU and fundamental rights are an 
integral part of them.
209
 
 
In Article 6.3 TEU it is explicitly stated, that the ECHR constitutes general 
principles. Article 3 ECHR states the non-refoulement principle and the 
principle must therefore be considered a general principle. 
 
4.1.2.3 Regulation 2016/1624 
In Regulation 2016/1624 several references are made to the non-
refoulement principle and fundamental rights for asylum seekers. In Article 
1, it is stated that the Agency shall act in full respect of fundamental rights. 
Article 34 is dedicated to the protection of fundamental rights and sets up a 
fundamental rights strategy. The Article states:  
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“The European Border and Coast Guard shall guarantee the protection of fundamental 
rights in the performance of its tasks under this Regulation in accordance with relevant 
Union law, in particular the Charter, relevant international law – including the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol and obligations related to 
access to international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement 
principle.” 
 
It is thereby explicitly stated in the Article that the Agency must, in all its 
tasks, act in accordance with the non-refoulement principle.
210
  
 
Further Articles in Regulation 2016/1624 that deals with fundamental rights 
of asylum-seekers are especially Articles 35, 70, 71 and 72. Article 35 puts 
up the code of conduct and states that fundamental rights shall be respected. 
In Article 70 a consultative forum is set up as a platform for relevant 
organisations, such as UNHCR, to assist the Agency with advice in 
fundamental rights matters. Article 71 states that the fundamental rights 
officer shall monitor the compliance with fundamental rights and promote 
respect of fundamental rights. Lastly Article 72 set up the complaint 
mechanism, which is a new feature in Regulation 2016/1624. Through the 
complaint mechanism any person that is directly affected and considers 
themselves being subject of a breach of fundamental rights within 
operations of the Agency can submit a complaint in writing to the 
Agency.
211
  
 
These Articles deal with fundamental rights in Regulation 2016/1624. In 
Title 4.2.2.3, an assessment will be carried out whether this Regulation can 
be used as source for arguing that the European Border and Coast Guard has 
a responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of asylum seekers.  
 
4.1.3 The Relation between International Law 
and Union Law  
Article 3.5 TEU states that the Union is bound by international law. In the 
case law of the CJEU it has also been established that international 
customary law binds the Union.
212
 This is also strengthened by the fact that 
the Union has an international legal personality.
213
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4.2 Responsibility of the European Border 
and Coast Guard to Protect 
Fundamental Rights of Asylum-
Seekers 
In the previous part, all relevant sources within international law and Union 
law has been presented and described. Within this part, all these legal 
sources will be presented again but this time an assessment in regards to the 
legal source will be carried out. The assessment aims to answer whether the 
European Border and Coast Guard has a responsibility to protect the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers.  
 
4.2.1 International Law 
Here an assessment on the different legal sources within international law 
will be carried out. The same division into subparts as above has been made 
also within this part.    
 
4.2.1.1 The Geneva Convention 
As stated earlier, the Union is not a Party to the Geneva Convention.
214
 The 
Convention on its own can therefore, not be used for arguing that the 
Agency must follow the non-refoulement principle and thereby has a 
responsibility to protect fundamental rights of asylum seekers. However, the 
Convention has had a strong influence on international customary law and 
therefore, a complete assessment must be made in regards to international 
customary law and whether the non-refoulement principles can be regarded 
as binding upon the Union and its bodies.  
 
4.2.1.2 International Customary Law and Jus Cogens 
As stated in Title 4.1.1.2, international customary law plays an important 
role within the field of international law. The most important part of 
international customary law is jus cogens. The features and definition of jus 
cogens has already been given. In this part an assessment will be made on 
whether the non-refoulement principle is jus cogens.  
 
Jean Allain, assistant Professor of Public International Law at American 
University in Cairo, Egypt, argues that the non-refoulement principle is jus 
cogens. Allain bases this on the fact that the principle has been widely 
practiced and followed by several States and organisations ever since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, thereby being international customary law.
215
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However, the question remains whether the States and organisations follow 
the non-refoulement principle because they believe it to be jus cogens.  
 
According to Jean Allain, with base in the Conclusions of the UNHCR, the 
non-refoulement principle is considered to be jus cogens by the States and 
organisation that practice it.
216
 That the non-refoulement principle is not 
always followed by States or organisations does not cause it to lose its 
nature of jus cogens. This has been established by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in the case Nicaragua.
217
 The non-refoulement principle is jus 
cogens and thereby binding upon all States and international organisations. 
This implies that the Union is bound by the non-refoulement principle even 
though they are not Parties to the Geneva Convention. Since the European 
Border and Coast Guard is a Union body that acts for the Union, this also 
applies to the Agency. 
 
The UNHCR has stated that the non-refoulement principle is jus cogens. 
UNHCR states that some non-state actors are also bound by the principle, 
among them, Frontex is explicitly mentioned. This was stated by the 
UNHCR in 2014.
218
 Even though Frontex now has a new regulation and has 
been developed into the European Border and Coast Guard it remains the 
same body.
219
 The non-refoulement principle is thereby binding on the 
Agency. 
 
As earlier stated it is important to consider the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties within the area of international customary law as a source 
within international law. Advocate General Sharpston argues that the 
Vienna Convention is part of the Union’s Legal order.220 It must therefore 
be assessed that Article 64 is applicable on Union law. This implies that if 
any part of Union law is in conflict with jus cogens, it must be regarded as 
void and be terminated. Jus cogens must be assessed to prevail Union law. 
 
Therefore, the European Border and Coast Guard is responsible to act in 
compliance with the non-refoulement principle and protect the fundamental 
rights of asylum-seekers, regardless of what is stated in Union law such as 
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the Charter or Regulation 2016/1624. However, in order to make a complete 
assessment, the analyses will also examine whether the Union has a 
responsibility to protect fundamental rights through Union law. It is 
important that every source is thoroughly assessed.  
 
4.2.1.3 Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organisations 
ARIO Article 7 states that an international organisation can only be held 
responsible when they are regarded as having effective control of the 
operation that is carried out by the international organisation and the states. 
Effective control refers to the operational command and control.  
 
Mungianu argues that based on the 2011 Frontex Regulation, Frontex 
cannot be seen as having effective control.
221
 This is because the host 
Member State gives the instructions and in the 2011 Frontex Regulation the 
view of the coordinating officer is merely to be considered.
222
 However, the 
instructions must be in accordance with the operational plan that can be seen 
as a decision made at Union level since it is adopted by Frontex and the 
Member States.
223
 In the 2011 Frontex Regulation no technical and 
operational strategy is mentioned.
224
  
 
According to Mungianu, ARIO requires that the international body is the 
only body to exercise direction and control. Otherwise, the international 
organisation cannot be in effective control.
225
 It can be argued that through 
the changes presented in Regulation 2016/1624 the control of the Agency 
has increased. The views of the coordinating officer must now be followed 
as far as possible.
226
 Through the technical and operational strategy the 
Agency is also given a bigger influence on the Member State’s action and 
instructions during the different operations. The Member State must always 
follow the strategy, even when issuing instructions.
227
 The operational plan 
in Regulation 2016/1624 is also made binding on the Member State and the 
Agency.
228
 In the 2011 Frontex Regulation the operational plan is not 
binding, instead the Agency shall ensure that it is implemented.
229
 
 
The new mandate could be seen as enlarging the Agency’s control over the 
instructions from the host Member State to the European Border Guard 
Teams. However, as Mungianu argues, ARIO requires that the international 
body is the only body to exercise direction and control.
230
 This is not case 
with the operations of the Agency. The host Member State still has some 
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control over the operational plan and the instructions during the operation, 
even in situations at the external border requiring urgent action. Even in 
these operations the host Member State must agree on the operational plan 
and is the one issuing the instructions.
231
  
 
Using only ARIO as source, the answer to the second research question is 
that the Agency does not have a responsibility to protect fundamental rights. 
However, ARIO is not customary international law, it only has legal value.
 
232
 The non-refoulement principle, being jus cogens, is, on the other hand, 
legally binding.
 233
 That obligation must therefore, be assessed to supersede 
Article 7 in ARIO. 
 
4.2.2 Union Law 
In this part, the different legal sources within the Union is further examined. 
An argumentation is presented on whether the legal sources can be used to 
argue that the European Border and Coast has a responsibility to protect 
fundamental rights of asylum seekers.  
   
4.2.2.1 The Charter 
The non-refoulement principle is stated in the Charter Article 19. The 
Charter is primary law and shall be followed when the Union is acting.
234
 
Since the Union acts through the European Border and Coast Guard, the 
Charter can be assessed as applicable also on the Agency. However, the 
application of the Charter on the Union’s bodies is limited by the 
subsidiarity principle.  
 
For Member States the Charter is only applicable when they are 
implementing Union law.
235
 A lot of research have been made in this area to 
define when a Member State is implementing Union law. However, in 
regards to the application of the Charter on the Union and the limitation set 
by the subsidiarity principle, few sources can be found. An argumentation is 
therefore needed in regards to whether applying the non-refoulement 
principle in Article 19, in the Charter, on the Agency is violating the 
subsidiarity principle.  
 
The subsidiarity principle implies that power shall be exercised as close as 
possible to the citizens. This entails that the Union can only act when the 
goal can be achieved more effectively on Union level than by the Member 
States.
236 
The goal within this matter is that the non-refoulement principle is 
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followed.  
 
The non-refoulement principle entails the fundamental rights to enter a 
State, apply for asylum and not to be returned until it has been established 
that the person does not qualify as a refugee. These are executive powers, 
and for them to be executed as close as possible to the citizen, they should 
be executed by the Member State itself.  
 
It can therefore on one hand, be argued that to be in compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle these executive powers should be exercised by the 
Member States and not by the Union. The asylum-seeker is applying for 
asylum in the State and it is therefore reasonable that this application should 
be taken care of by the State itself. This would entail that the Charter is not 
applicable. The European Border and Coast Guard would not be bound by 
the non-refoulement principle in the Charter in that case and have no 
responsibility, with grounds in the Charter, to protect the fundamental rights 
of the asylum-seekers.  
 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the subsidiarity principle is fulfilled. 
Being granted asylum in one Member State allows for free movement 
within the whole Union, since the internal borders have been removed.
237
 
The approval of an asylum application is something that affects all Member 
States and all Union members. The execution of asylum procedures and the 
protection of fundamental rights in regards to the non-refoulement principle 
is presently done by the Member States. However, this is not working 
properly. In many Member States the asylum procedures take several years 
and are, in many cases, not properly carried out. In Hungary, the asylum 
seekers are put in camps at the State’s borders.238 There have also been 
several examples in Greece and Italy, where asylum-seekers were not 
granted access to asylum procedures.
239
 This could be used to argue that the 
protection of fundamental rights for asylum-seekers is not sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States. It would therefore be justified to put it on 
Union level to assure that the non-refoulement principle is followed and that 
the fundamental rights for asylum seekers are protected. This entails that the 
subsidiarity principle is fulfilled and the European Border and Coast Guard 
can be regarded as having responsible to protect the non-refoulement 
principle with grounds in the Charter. 
 
However, to be able to carry out a complete assessment on whether Article 
19 on the non-refoulement principle is applicable on the European Border 
and Coast Guard, the allocation of competences must be considered. It must 
be assessed whether the Charter is applicable on the Union in situations 
where the Union does not have competence. A further assessment on the 
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complexity between the allocation of competences and responsibility to 
protect fundamental rights in Union law is given in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2.2.2 General Principles 
As already assessed, ECHR constitutes general principles of Union law. 
Article 3 ECHR states the non-refoulement principle and therefore, the 
principle must be regarded as being a general principle within Union law.  
 
In regards to ECHR being general principle of Union law it is important to 
remember that the right to non-refoulement is absolute in the ECHR, and it 
should therefore be an absolute right within Union law as well. This implies 
that derogation from the principle is not allowed, and that it should be 
complied with at all times.
240
  
 
However, the same problem as with the Charter arises. An assessment in 
regards to the allocation of competences must be made in order to decide 
whether Union law is applicable on the actions of the Agency that must be 
carried out in order to protect the non-refoulement principle. Once again, the 
reader must be directed to the assessment in Chapter 5.  
 
4.2.2.3 Regulation 2016/1624 
Strong criticism was directed at Regulation 2016/1624 by UNHCR, 
Amnesty international, the International Commission of Jurists and the 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles. Regulation 2016/1624 does not 
clearly state what responsibility the Agency has, to protect fundamental 
rights of asylum seekers.
241
     
 
Regulation 2016/1624 consists of several provisions that refer to 
fundamental rights and the non-refoulement principle.
242
 This shows that the 
Union, through the European Border and Coast Guard, is willing to take 
responsibility to protect fundamental rights. However, concerns have been 
raised, that the focus on fundamental rights within Regulation 2016/1624 is 
nothing more than empty statements with a weak relation to the actual 
practice of the European Border and Coast Guard.
243
 
 
Nonetheless, these provisions are in the Regulation and should therefore 
have the same legal value as any other provision in the Regulation. They 
should be valued and acted upon accordingly to in practice as well. This 
implies that the Agency should have a responsibility to act in accordance 
with and to protect the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. However, 
once again the allocation of competences must be regarded and the reader is 
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therefore directed to Chapter 5.    
   
4.2.3 The Relation between International Law 
and Union Law  
As earlier assessed the Union is bound by international law. CJEU has even 
stated that the Union is bound by international customary law. The relation 
between jus cogens and Union law is a complex matter. Lawyers have 
argued before that Union law trump jus cogens due to the lex specialis rule. 
The Treaties being more specialised law would therefore prevail jus 
cogens.
244
 This can be questioned since the very basis of jus cogens is that it 
cannot be subject to restraints from one State or organisation.
245
  
 
The foundation of jus cogens is that it is a norm from where no derogation is 
allowed. This must be considered applicable upon Union law. Union law 
that conflicts with jus cogens must therefore be considered void. This is also 
in line with the assessment in Title 4.2.1.2 on the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. The responsibility for the European Border and Coast 
Guard to protect fundamental rights of asylum-seeker through jus cogens is 
therefore to be established to supersede Union law. However, also in this 
aspect the allocation of competences must be regarded and the reader is 
therefore directed to Chapter 5. 
 
4.2.4 Protection against Terrorism and the 
Responsibility of the European Border 
and Coast Guard to Protect Fundamental 
Rights of Asylum-Seekers 
The underlying reason for expanding the mandates of Frontex and develop it 
into the European Border and Coast Guard was to protect the Union from 
terrorism, as stated in the introduction to Chapter 2. Several scholars 
consider the protection of terrorism and the protection of fundamental rights 
of asylum-seekers as being two conflicting interests and the problem with 
Regulation 2016/1624 is that too much focus is put on the interest to protect 
the Union from terrorism.
246
  
 
However, it can be argued that the Agency having a responsibility to protect 
the fundamental rights would also be in line with the interest to protect the 
Union against terrorism. The responsibility to protect the fundamental rights 
of asylum-seekers would include that the European Border and Coast Guard 
must ensure that all asylum-seekers are allowed entry to the State, thereby 
being properly registered instead of just “waved-through” or sent away at 
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the borders. The Agency would also be responsible to assure that the 
asylum-seekers are given a proper asylum assessment which would make it 
easier to identify false documentation and ensure that only persons in need 
of asylum are also granted asylum. With the Agency ensuring that return 
decisions are properly carried out, persons that could be of any threat would 
be sent back to their country or being correctly sentenced. The interest to 
protect the Union against terrorism and protecting the fundamental rights of 
the asylum seekers must therefore not stand in conflict with each other. 
 
4.3 Conclusions on the Responsibility of 
the Agency to Protect Fundamental 
Rights of Asylum-Seekers 
To conclude, there is reason to argue that the European Border and Coast 
Guard has a responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of asylum-
seekers, even though it would mean interfering with the competences of the 
Member States. The violations against the fundamental rights of asylum-
seekers needs to be taken care of. The Member States are not doing enough 
and the European Border and Coast Guard are in an excellent position to 
ensure that handling the asylum-seekers is done in full compliance with the 
non-refoulement principle. The Agency has people on the ground, it sets up 
the technical and operational strategy that all Member States are bound by, 
it has a big influence on the operational plan and on the instructions, that are 
given out to the border guards at the external borders. The fundamental 
rights of asylum-seekers are very important and must be handled as more 
than empty statements. The non-refoulement principle is binding and the 
Agency must protect this principle and the fundamental rights of the asylum 
seekers.   
 
The answer to the second research should is that the European Border and 
Coast Guard has a responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of 
asylum-seekers. This is based on international law and the fact that the non-
refoulement principle is jus cogens.  
 
However, yet another assessment must be made. That the Agency has a 
responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers implies 
that in order to upheld this responsibility the Agency must intervene in 
executive functions such as the issuing of decisions to entry, asylum and 
return. As earlier assessed in regards to the first research question on the 
competences of the Agency, these executive functions belong solely to the 
competences of the Member States. That the Agency intervenes in these 
functions is a violation to the Union Treaties and threatens the sovereignty 
of the Member States. A further assessment must therefore be made on the 
relation between the allocation of competences in Union law and the 
responsibility to protect the fundamental rights in international law. This 
assessment is carried out in Chapter 5.      
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5 Conclusions and Discussion 
5.1 Objective and Research Questions 
The objective of the thesis has been reached. The problems that arose at the 
negotiations of Regulation 2016/1624 has been examined and the research 
questions have been answered. 
 
The first of these two problems were that the Member States considered the 
delegated competences to the European Border and Coast Guard being too 
wide. The research question on whether the competences delegated to the 
Agency in Regulation 2016/1624 is violating the Union Treaties is answered 
in Chapter 3. The competences are not in compliance with the allocation of 
competences and Regulation 2016/1624 is, in some aspect, violating the 
Union Treaties.  
 
The second problem was that Regulation 2016/1624 was regarded as not 
protecting the fundamental rights of asylum seekers. These concerns were 
raised by organisations such as UNHCR and legal professors, e.g. Steve 
Peers. The second research question on whether the Agency has a 
responsibility to protect the non-refoulement principle is answered in 
Chapter 4. Through international law, since the non-refoulement principle is 
jus cogens, the Union has a responsibility to protect the fundamental rights 
of asylum-seekers.  
 
These conclusions however, raise a new problem:  
 
Through the answer to the first research question it is established that the 
Union has no competence to intervene in the executive powers of issuing 
decision of entry, asylum and return. These executive functions belong 
solely to the competence of the Member States, and if the Union interferes it 
is a violation of the Union treaties. Such a violation is a threat to the 
sovereignty of the Member States. 
 
Through the answer to the second question a responsibility is put on the 
Agency to protect the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. This is 
grounded in binding international customary law, jus cogens. To fulfil this 
responsibility the Agency must interfere in the executive powers to issue 
decisions of entry, asylum and return. This type of interference is considered 
a violation to the Union Treaties and a threat to the sovereignty of the 
Member States. 
 
A conflict between the allocation of competences in Union law and the non-
refoulement principle being jus cogens in international law has occurred.   
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5.2 The Agency’s Responsibility to 
Protect Fundamental Rights of 
Asylum-Seekers and the Sovereignty 
of Member States 
The responsibility of the European Border and Coast Guard to protect the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers would require the Agency to interfere 
in executive powers of the Member States, such as issuing entry, asylum 
and return decisions. This violates the allocation of competences in the 
Union Treaties as assessed in Chapter 3. This also implies that a 
responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of asylum seekers cannot be 
based on any legal source within Union law. Therefore, the Charter or 
Regulation 2016/1624 cannot be used as ground for arguing that the Agency 
has a responsibility to protect fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. 
However, this argumentation cannot be used in regards to international law.  
 
The non-refoulement principle is jus cogens and thereby binding. The 
European Border and Coast Guard has a responsibility to protect the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers. But for the Agency to act accordingly 
to this responsibility it would mean that they are violating Union law. They 
would be interfering in competences that belong to the Member States, 
thereby threatening the sovereignty of the Member States.  
 
Two arguments can be used to argue that the responsibility to protect the 
non-refoulement principle should prevail Union law. This first argument is 
that, as assessed in Title 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.3, jus cogens supersede Union law. 
The second argument is that, following the argumentation of Elis Muir in 
Title 2.3, fundamental rights can stretch the competences of the Union.  
 
As assessed in Title 2.3 there are several cases where the CJEU has 
concluded that Union law on fundamental rights is applicable on the actions 
of Member States. Even in situations where the actions are outside the 
competences of the Union.
247
 The question is whether the same conclusion 
can be reached in regards to when a body of the Union, such as the 
European Border and Coast Guard, acts outside the competences of the 
Union in order to fulfil the responsibility to protect fundamental rights.  
 
In Title 2.3 Muir argues that fundamental rights can expand the scope of 
Union law in three situations.
248
 Here, the third situation is of interest. The 
Union has competences within the area of border control, see Articles 77 
and 79 TFEU. The responsibility to protect fundamental rights of asylum- 
seekers relates to this area but in regards to these competences, this 
responsibility is not expressly regulated. Through international law it has 
been assessed that the Agency has the responsibility to protect fundamental 
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rights of asylum seekers. Also in Union law is the protection of fundamental 
rights for asylum-seekers regarded as the non-refoulement principle is stated 
in Article 19 in the Charter. This is thereby a situation where the 
competence of the Union can be expanded.  
 
It is stated in Article 6.1 TEU and Article 51.2 that the Charter shall not 
extend the competences of the Union. However, one of the founding 
principles for the Union is to respect fundamental rights and an important 
aim of the Union is that these rights are protected.
249
 The CJEU has allowed 
for the expansion of the application of Union law in regards to action of 
Member States.
250
 The Union also aims to be more than an economic union 
and to justify its existence by claiming to guarantee stability and 
prosperity.
251
 The focus on being more than an economic Union is also 
showed in Commission President Juncker’s speech the State of the Union in 
2015, where he said: “We Europeans should know and should never forget 
why giving refuge and complying with the fundamental right to asylum is so 
important.” The CJEU and the Union has allowed for the expansion of 
competences in order to protect fundamental rights in the actions of Member 
State. It should be argued that the same expansion of competences can be 
made also in the actions of the Union. Thereby, it should be regarded that 
the competences of the Agency can be expanded and the Agency can 
interfere with the executive powers of the Member States in order to protect 
the fundamental rights of asylum seekers.  
 
However, these arguments would never be accepted by the Member States. 
The political climate in regards to the allocation of competences between 
the Union and Member States is an ever-pending situation. At times, there 
have been developments that enhanced supranationalism, as the agreement 
in 1967 on direct elections to the Assembly (now European Parliament).
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As well as other times where the focus had been on the sovereignty of the 
Member States and the will to stop the Union from becoming a 
supranational organisation, such as the establishment of the subsidiary 
principle at the entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.
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At the moment, the political climate is focused on the national sovereignty 
of the Member States, as seen with e.g. Brexit, where the United Kingdom 
has activated Article 50 TEU and is leaving the Union.
254
 A conferral of 
competences to the Union to take an even bigger role in the executive 
powers of the Member States is therefore very unlikely.  
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 “A renewed nationalism is stalking Europe”, Financial Times, July 11, 2016, 
<www.ft.com/content/53fc4518-4520-11e6-9b66-0712b3873ae1>, accessed 2017-05-08. 
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5.3 Final Conclusion 
The true conflict of interest in regards to border control is not the protection 
against terrorism and the protection of the fundamental rights of asylum 
seekers. These are interests that can be reached collectively. The real 
conflict of interests for the European Border and Coast Guard is between the 
protection of fundamental rights of the asylum seekers and the protection of 
the sovereignty of the Member States. 
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Supplement A 
- Please note that these spreadsheets are only to give guidance on where 
some of the provisions within an area can be found, these lists are not 
exhaustive. 
 
 
Exclusive competence 
Art. 2.1 TFEU: only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts 
 
Art. 3.1 TFEU 
- Customs union 
- The establishing of the competition rules for the 
functioning of the internal market 
- Monetary policy for the Member State whose 
currency is the euro 
- The conservation of marine biological resources 
under the common fisheries policy 
- Common commercial policy 
TEU 
 
TFEU 
Art. 28, 30-37 
 
 
Art. 101-109 
 
Art. 3.4 
 
Art. 136-138 
 
 Art. 13, 38, 
43.2-43.3. 
 Art. 206-207 
Art. 3.2 TFEU 
The Union shall also have exclusive competence for 
the conclusion of an international agreement when:  
- its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act   
  of the Union or 
- is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its  
  internal competence or 
- in so far as its conclusion may affect common  
   rules or alter their scope 
TEU 
 
TFEU 
Art. 216-219 
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Shared competences 
Art. 2.2 TFEU: …the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts 
- Matters within these areas can be pre-empted by the Union. In some of the detailed provisions 
is pre-emption limited. 
Art. 4.1 TFEU 
The category of shared competence is residual 
 
Art. 4.2 TFEU 
- Internal market 
- Social policy, for the aspects defined in this 
Treaty 
- Economic, social and territorial cohesion 
- Agriculture and fisheries, excluding the 
conservation of marine biological resources 
- Environment 
- Consumer protection 
- Transport 
- Trans-European networks 
- Energy 
- Area of freedom, security and justice  
- Common safety concerns in public health 
matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty 
TEU TFEU 
Art. 3.3 Art. 13, 26-27  
 Art. 151-161  
 
Art. 3.3 Art. 14, 174-178  
 
 
Art. 13, 38-44  
Art. 3.3 Art. 11, 191-193  
 Art. 12, 169 
 Art. 13, 90-100 
 Art. 170-172 
 Art. 194 
Art. 3.2, 4.2 Art. 67-89 
 Art. 168,5-5 
Parallel (shared) competence  
– Some of the shared competence cannot be completely pre-empted, instead some competence 
will always stay with the Member State 
Art. 4.3 TFEU 
- Research 
- Technological development 
- Space 
TEU TFEU 
 Art. 13, 179-188 Research  
and technological development Art. 3.3 
 Art. 13, 189 Space 
Art. 4.4 TFEU 
- Development cooperation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Humanitarian aid 
TEU TFEU 
 
 
Art. 186 Cooperation  
with third countries 
 
 
Art. 208-211 Development  
cooperation 
 
 
Art. 212-213 Economical,  
financial and technical  
cooperation with third 
countries 
 Art. 214 Humanitarian aid 
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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
Art. 2.4 The Union shall have competence, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union, to define and implement a 
common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of 
a common defence policy. 
 
Art. 2.4. TFEU 
- Common Foreign and Security Policy 
- Common Defence Policy 
TEU 
Art. 23-41 
Art. 42-46 
TFEU 
Art. 218, 275 
 
Competence to support, coordinate or supplement 
Art. 2.5 TFEU: …the Union shall have competence to support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States, without 
thereby superseding them in these areas 
- These areas shall not be harmonized as stated in Article 2.5 TFEU.  
Art. 6 TFEU 
- Protection and improvement of human health 
- Industry 
- Culture 
- Tourism 
- Education, vocational training, youth and 
sport 
- Civil protection 
- Administrative cooperation 
TEU TFEU 
 Art. 168  
 Art. 173 
Art. 3.3 Art. 167  
 Art. 195  
 Art. 165-166 
 
 Art. 196  
 Art. 197 
Competence to coordinate economic, employment and social policy 
Art. 2.3: The Member States shall coordinate their economic and 
employment policies within arrangements as determined by this Treaty 
 
Art. 5 TFEU 
- Economic policy   
- Employment policy   
- Social policy 
TEU TFEU 
Art. 120-126, 175  
Art. 145-150  
Art. 151-161  
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